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Insuring Against a Derivative Disaster:
The Case for Decentralized Risk Management

Jeffrey Manns *
Abstract: This Article makes the case for a decentralized risk management strategy for
identifying and defusing future bubble markets. It suggests how the government can
enlist private “gatekeeper guarantors” to provide integrated insurance and monitoring
roles to complement the government’s management of systemic risks. It proposes the
enactment of a federal mandate that systemically significant financial entities (or
participants in systemically significant financial sectors) secure private guarantees to
cover a percentage of their potential liabilities (above a loss threshold). Gatekeeper
guarantors would act as “circuit breakers” of systemic risk by serving as self-interested
monitors of risk taking and tying clients’ coverage to ongoing constraints on risk taking.
Gatekeeper guarantors would serve as “bailout buffers” by providing financial backing in
the event of defaults and thereby mitigating the government’s potential liability exposure.
This expansive role would come with government oversight to ensure that gatekeeper
guarantors satisfy reserve requirements, so that they can credibly serve as sea walls in the
face of future financial tsunamis. This Article will illustrate the potential for
decentralized risk management by showing how a mandate for private reinsurance (or its
functional equivalent) may reduce systemic risks in the over-the-counter derivatives
market. Reinsurers would bear a percentage of derivative participants’ liability, which
would incentivize reinsurers to charge premiums reflecting their risk assessments and to
monitor and condition clients’ liability exposure. The repeat-player status of reinsurers
would position them to force derivatives’ participants to change their risk exposure as
market conditions unfold. Reinsurers would have leverage to push insured parties to
demand disclosures from counter-parties, thereby heightening transparency and reducing
risks for their clients and the market as a whole. Government monitoring could build on
existing state oversight of reinsurers, but provide teeth with expanded reserve
requirements to ensure reinsurers are equipped to handle this role.
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Introduction
The recent bailouts and financial reforms underscored the danger that the federal
government will overstretch its resources and abilities in centralizing risk management
and internalizing the costs of private sector failures. In the long run the federal
government lacks the means to act as the sole overseer and backstop of the financial
world on its own. Instead, this Article makes the case for embracing a strategy of
decentralized risk management to identify and take the air out of future bubble markets.
This proposal shows how the federal government can enlist private “gatekeeper
guarantors” to provide integrated insurance and monitoring roles to police systemic risks,
while subjecting these private actors to reserve requirements to ensure their financial
wherewithal. It proposes the enactment of a public mandate that systemically significant
financial entities (or participants in systemically significant financial sectors) secure
private guarantees to cover a set percentage of their potential liabilities. 1
Gatekeeper guarantors would act as “circuit breakers” of systemic risk by serving
as self-interested private monitors of risk taking. They would be in a position to identify
excessive risk taking by making ongoing disclosures a condition of guarantees. They
would have the ability and incentive to demand that insured parties temper risk taking or
lose the coverage. Gatekeeper guarantors would also serve as “bailout buffers” by
providing financial backing to systemically significant institutions in the event of defaults
and thereby mitigate the government’s potential liability exposure. This expansive role
for gatekeeper guarantors should come with government oversight to ensure that
gatekeeper guarantors face and meet reserve requirements, so that they can serve as
credible sea walls in the face of future financial tsunamis. This Article will illustrate the
potential for decentralized risk management by showing how a mandate for private
reinsurance may reduce systemic risks in the $450 trillion dollar over-the-counter
derivatives market. 2
The idea of gatekeeper guarantors represents a synthesis of two distinct concepts:
gatekeepers and guarantors. Gatekeepers, such as rating agencies and accounting firms,
have long enjoyed appeal as potentially cost-effective means for outsourcing public

1

The Dodd-Frank Act designated commercial banking groups with assets of $50 billion or more as
“systemically important financial institutions” (SIFIs), and empowered the Financial Stability Oversight
Council—in consultation with the Federal Reserve—to determine which additional non-bank financial
institutions should be treated as SIFIs. See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and
Inadequate Response to the Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, 89 ORE. L. REV. 951, 993–96 (2011). SIFIs are
subject to special prudential standards and are potentially subject to Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA)
wind-ups. In contrast, this Article embraces a broader conception of “systemically significant” firms that
may be subject to a gatekeeper guarantor mandate.
2
See Henry T.C. Hu, The SEC Speaks in 2010 – Testimony Concerning the Over-the-counter
Derivatives Market Act of 2009 Before the House Committee on Financial Services, 1784 PLI/Corp 421,
423 (Oct. 7, 2009) (discussing how “[t]he derivatives market has grown enormously since the late 1990s to
approximately $450 trillion of outstanding notional amount in June 2009”).

3

enforcement roles to private parties. 3 The distinctive feature of gatekeepers is that their
private roles equip them with the means and ability to further public goals by detecting
excessive risk taking or wrongdoing by clients and to intervene to stop or disclose the
activity. 4 While gatekeepers enjoy great potential, in practice traditional gatekeepers
often lack the motivation to oversee and constrain excessive risk taking. For example,
rating agencies, lawyers, and accountants face perverse incentives to downplay or paper
over risks their clients face because they have no interest in biting the hand that feeds.5
Reputational and liability sanctions may fail to incentivize gatekeepers. The same skills
and leverage that enable gatekeepers to detect excessive risks may enable them to cover
up both clients’ and their own tracks. 6 Gatekeepers’ shortcomings in policing individual
clients magnify systemic risks in the aggregate by creating an appearance of oversight
that belies the reality of monitors with little at stake.

3

A broad literature has explored the potential for enlisting private gatekeepers to perform public
enforcement functions. See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2004) (describing a gatekeeper as a
“reputational intermediary” who “receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in misconduct”
compared to the primary wrongdoer); Assaf Hamdani, Gatekeeper Liability, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 53, 63
(2003) (defining gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell a product that is necessary for clients
wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain activities”); Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on
Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regulation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1019, 1050–54 (1993) (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at least extremely
useful, services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities, and who cannot easily be
replaced by wrongdoers); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Strategy, 2 J.
L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986) (defining gatekeepers as “private parties who are able to disrupt misconduct
by withholding their cooperation from wrongdoers”). This article understands gatekeepers as private actors
whose role as suppliers or consumers of lawful goods or services provides them with the cost-effective
ability to detect and potentially prevent wrongdoing.
4
See Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD.
L. REV. 869, 883 (1990) (arguing that a defining feature of gatekeepers is that the targeted “misconduct
cannot occur without the gatekeeper’s participation”); Kraakman, supra note 3, at 54, 61–63 (arguing that
“a specialized good, service, or form of certification that is essential for the wrongdoing to succeed—is the
‘gate’ that the gatekeeper keeps”).
5
The defining characteristic of gatekeepers is their dual capacity: the services they offer may serve
lawful ends or they may enable wrongdoers to pursue their illegal activity. Other gatekeepers may create
the demand that attracts prospective wrongdoers, such as employers whose attempts to depress wage levels
may attract underage workers or undocumented aliens. See Jeffrey Manns, Private Monitoring of
Gatekeepers, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 941-44. Similarly, American companies may foster illicit activity
by outsourcing production facilities to firms in developing countries, which (“unbeknownst” to the
American companies) abuse human rights to cut costs or bribe officials to aid their American clients. See
H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L.
REV. 1, 29–35 (1998) (laying out the scope of parent-subsidiary liability under the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act).
6
The more complex the activity, the more prospective offenders may enjoy an advantage over
enforcers in obfuscating their activities, a fact which creates the need for gatekeepers. See Donald C.
Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial Reporting, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1, 3–16 (2004); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a
World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 18–20 (discussing how “the increasingly widespread
problem of complexity” makes it difficult for public enforcers to regulate and oversee “virtually all
securitization and derivatives deals and other forms of structured-financing transactions”).

4

Integrating the concept of gatekeepers with guarantor roles would remedy the
incentive problem that plagues gatekeepers by focusing gatekeepers’ self-interest on
effective risk management and oversight of their clients. A guarantor assumes a
percentage or all of the liability for its client’s obligations in the event of a default. 7 As a
result, guarantors have the incentive to demand as much information, conditions, and
compensation from clients as they believe necessary to justify the liability exposure. 8
Guarantors must learn the hard way about what level of scrutiny to impose as a condition
of issuing guarantees, since they must internalize the costs of failure. The fact that
guarantor liability is self-executing allows regulators to sidestep the difficult challenges
of establishing what level of diligence or scrutiny is sufficient to satisfy a gatekeeping
duty and what type of sanctions wayward gatekeepers should face. Instead, the primary
government role would be to set a baseline of reserve requirements to provide assurance
that guarantors can plausibly live up to their obligations if large-scale defaults occur.
This Article’s proposal would deputize guarantors as gatekeepers of systemic risk.
This approach would impose a mandate for systemically significant financial entities (or
participants in systemically significant sectors) to secure guarantees for a set percentage
of their liabilities. It would enlist guarantors’ potential as repeat players by requiring
guarantees not only to cover a financial entity’s particular transaction, but also its broader
liabilities or a category of the financial entity’s liability exposure. The rationale for this
approach would be to ensure that guarantors have incentives to monitor and shape the
conditions imposed on their clients on a rolling basis in a swifter way than regulators.
This approach would impose higher financial and informational costs on
corporations than conventional gatekeepers may impose. But it would entail minimal
governmental costs and oversight. Gatekeeper guarantors would independently negotiate
guarantees, oversee clients, and resolve liabilities. Government oversight could focus on
ensuring that gatekeeper guarantors meet reserve requirements, so that they can plausibly
live up their obligations in the face of low probability, high impact events. Another
virtue of this approach is that it would not require creating entirely new gatekeeper
guarantors. Instead, it could build on the existing multi-trillion dollar reinsurance
industry whose experience in gauging insurers’ catastrophic risks could be extended to
financial contexts, 9 as well as draw in new entrants with deep pockets and relevant
experience to take on this role such as sovereign wealth funds and private equity firms.
This Article shows the potential for decentralized risk management by suggesting
how a mandate for private reinsurance may reduce systemic risks in the $450 trillion

7

See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
47, 49-52 (1999) (discussing the economic logic of guarantee arrangements); Neil B. Cohen, Striking the
Balance: The Evolving Nature of Suretyship Defenses, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1027-1028 (1993)
(explaining the purpose for guarantees and incentives for the parties involved).
8
See Katz, supra note 7, at 59 (discussing how guarantees address potential moral hazard by enlisting
the guarantor's efforts in reducing or managing risks of debtor misconduct).
9
See Thomas Holzheu & Roman Lechner, The Global Reinsurance Market, in INTERNATIONAL
INSURANCE MARKETS (J. David Cummins & Bertrand Vernard eds. 2003) 877, 881-883 (laying out the
scale of the global reinsurance industry).

5

dollar over-the-counter derivatives market. 10 This case study is chosen in part because
the Dodd-Frank Act’s clearinghouse model for derivatives oversight incorporates some
aspects of a gatekeeper guarantor approach. 11 In theory the Dodd-Frank Act’s mandate
that over-the-counter derivatives be traded on exchanges and that the trades be cleared
and settled by central clearinghouses 12 means that these intermediaries will both monitor
and pool participants’ risk. 13 In particular, the appeal of clearinghouses is that they are
committed to complete derivative transactions if a participant defaults by imposing
capital calls on the clearinghouse’s members. 14
10

See Henry T.C. Hu, The SEC Speaks in 2010 – Testimony Concerning the Over-the-counter
Derivatives Market Act of 2009 Before the House Committee on Financial Services, 1784 PLI/Corp 421,
423 (Oct. 7, 2009).
11
The size and significance of the derivatives markets raise systemic risk concerns, and this danger has
sparked an array of ideas about how to temper systemic risks without undercutting the viability of
derivatives’ markets. See, e.g., Colleen Baker, Regulating the Invisible: The Case of Over-The-Counter
Derivatives, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287, 1291-1295 (2010) (calling for stronger regulatory cooperation
between the SEC and the CFTC to regulate derivatives as well as an international framework for regulating
derivatives); Frank D’Souza, Nan S. Ellis, & Lisa M. Fairchild, Illuminating the Need for Regulation in
Dark Markets: Proposed Regulation of the OTC Derivatives Market, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 473, 477-479
(2010) (highlighting the inadequacies of derivatives reform and calling for the merger of the SEC and
CFTC to oversee derivatives regulation); Kristin N. Johnson, Things Fall Apart: Regulating the Credit
Default Swap Commons, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 167, 176-77 (2011) (making the case for a “community
governance” model with a federally registered self-regulatory organization overseeing the derivatives
industry); Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized
Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 50-52 (2011)
(arguing that the Federal Reserve should be authorized to extend credit to OTC derivatives’ clearinghouses
to meet their emergency needs); Lynn Stout, Regulate OTC Derivatives by Deregulating Them, 32(3)
REGULATION 30, 32-35 (2009) (arguing that derivatives regulation should revert to the common-law
approach in which true hedging and insurance contracts are legally enforceable, while purely speculative
“wagering contracts are unenforceable, unless they are processed through private exchanges which use
capital and margin requirements to mitigate risks and over-leveraging”). This Article offers an innovative
approach towards derivatives reform in calling for the decentralization of risk management by requiring
participants to have a reinsurance backstop for a percentage of their liability exposure to create selfinterested oversight and constraints on leverage.
12
Clearinghouses “clear” trades by calculating the net payment obligations between participants.
Clearinghouses “settle” trades by overseeing the exchange of funds that concludes the transaction. See
Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards an Analytic Framework, 86
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1349, 1384 (2011).
13
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 723(a),
124 Stat. 1376, 1675-76, 1681 (2010) (to be codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2); see also David E. Skeel, Jr. &
Thomas H. Jackson, Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
152, 192-94 (2012) (providing an overview of the interface between derivatives exchange trading and
settlement and backing of trades by clearinghouses).
14
See, e.g., Christine Cuccia, Informational Asymmetry and OTC Transactions: Understanding the
Need to Regulate Derivatives, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 197, 216-219 (1997) (calling for banks to disclose the
risks and nature of derivatives to end users); Michael Greenberger, Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory
Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused
by an Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, 6 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 127, 166-67 (2011)
(arguing that the Dodd-Frank Act’s derivatives reforms have the potential to mitigate substantially systemic
risks posed by OTC derivatives if regulators use all of the tools granted to them under the legislation);
William Spencer Topham, Re-Regulating Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Observations on
Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and Future Derivative Regulation, 47 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 133, 134-35 (2010) (making the case for centralized clearing and exchange trading to attempt to
create complete transparency for derivatives markets); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of

6

But in practice, centralizing risk in clearinghouses may magnify systemic risk and
bolster market leverage -- the opposite of what reformers intended. 15 The problem is that
clearinghouses may suffer from similar conflicts of interest as conventional gatekeepers.
The compensation of clearinghouses depends on trading volume and scale and the
willingness of participants to use their services. As major players concentrate
transactions in a small number of clearinghouses, both clearinghouses and participants
may face little incentive to temper excessive leverage amid exuberant markets. Instead,
all would have incentives to double down on risk exposure, since sufficiently large
collective liability exposure in a crisis almost guarantees the failure of the clearinghouse
and a government bailout. 16
In contrast, a gatekeeper guarantor approach would mandate third-party
(re)insurance coverage for derivatives’ transactions and create self-interested oversight.
Reinsurers would bear a percentage of derivative participants’ liability. This liability
exposure would incentivize reinsurers to charge premiums reflecting their risk
assessments and to monitor and condition clients’ liability exposure. The repeat-player
status of reinsurers would position them to force derivatives’ participants to change their
risk exposure as market conditions unfold. Reinsurers would have leverage to push
insured parties to demand disclosures from counter-parties, thereby heightening
transparency and reducing risks for all concerned. Lastly, reinsurance pricing would
serve as a speculation tax as bona fide hedgers would presumably be able to secure much
lower reinsurance rates than speculators because of the lower risks involved. Combining
this expanded reinsurance role with heightened state or federal oversight and reserve
requirements would help to ensure that reinsurers are positioned to serve as sea walls to
mitigate the impact of future financial crises.
The net impact of decentralized oversight of derivatives’ participants would be a
significant reduction in systemic risk as reinsurers would have incentives to reign in
leverage before markets reach bubble levels. While mandatory reinsurance would not be
a panacea, it would offer policymakers a more credible backstop for the derivatives
industry that would mitigate the likelihood and scale of a future crisis.
Part I will make the case for enlisting gatekeeper guarantors as monitors of
corporate risk taking and systemic risks. Parts II and III will explore the potential for
gatekeeper guarantors to resolve systemic risk concerns in the over-the-counter
derivatives market and address potential objections.

Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, at 6-9 (forthcoming GEO. L.J. 2012) available on ssrn.com
(discussing the central role of clearinghouses in financial markets, but highlighting the legal and
informational limits of clearinghouses to mitigate the vast economic risks they face).
15
See Craig Pirrong, Derivatives Clearing Mandates: Cure or Curse?, 22(3) JOURNAL OF APPLIED
CORPORATE FINANCE 48, 50-52 (2010) (discussing how mandatory clearing of derivatives on
exchanges/clearinghouses may potentially increase systemic risks).
16
See infra Section II.B.

7

I. The Case for Gatekeeper Guarantors
The financial crisis exposed the limits of both public enforcers and traditional
private gatekeepers. The system-wide failures underscored the need to reconsider both
public and private roles and the potential for new alternatives. Private gatekeepers failed
at every level in dealing with the long build up to the subprime mortgage crisis. Lawyers
and accountants failed to recognize or report excessive risk taking and fraud by mortgage
brokers who were granting millions of adjustable rate mortgages often with fraudulent
documentation and without diligence review. Commercial and investment banks issued
trillions of dollars of subprime residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) and
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that camouflaged the actual risks. 17 Rating
agencies compromised their duties by failing to ring warning bells about a bubble market
and dubious debt packaging practices. 18 Purchasers of these instruments cannot escape
blame either in relying excessively on gatekeepers to assess risks. 19 The problem was
that so long as everyone was making money, gatekeepers “diligently” turned a blind eye
to their clients’ wayward ways and simply covered up or obscured the extent of risk. 20
Public regulators fared no better as banking and securities agencies also ignored
warning signs of a market bubble and were reluctant to take away the punch bowl in the
midst of a property-led economic boom. A growth-oriented monetary policy of low
interest rates, incentives for banks to heighten lending to high-risk borrowers, a hands-off
approach by banking and securities regulators, and over-reliance on gatekeepers’
accuracy and integrity were a fatal combination. No one in Washington, DC or Wall
Street was left with clean hands. Countless eyes witnessed the looming crisis, yet neither

17

RMBS and mortgage-based CDOs are debt obligations based on large pools of mortgage loans
whose cash flows are based on principal and interest payments from the underlying mortgages.
Approximately $1.7 trillion of subprime RMBS were issued from 2001 to 2006. See Adam B. Ashcraft &
Til Schuermann, Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit, 2, Aug. 19, 2008,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071189. The dollar values of subprime CDOs are harder to pinpoint
because of less transparency, but JP Morgan has estimated that over $600 billion in subprime CDOs were
issued over this period. See Jenny Anderson & Heather Timmons, Why a US Subprime Mortgage Crisis is
Felt Around the World, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2007, at A1.
18
See, e.g., Allen Ferrell, Jennifer E. Bethel, & Gang Hu, Legal and Economic Issues in Subprime
Litigation, 37-53 (March, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582 (discussing the legal issues
surrounding the extensive subprime litigation, such as Rule 10b-5 actions against banks, ERISA litigation,
and litigation against rating agencies). Cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the
Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW. 1403, 1408–09 (2002) (arguing “the collective failure of the
gatekeepers” lay at the heart of the accounting scandals); Hillary A. Sale, Gatekeepers, Disclosure, and
Issuer Choice, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403–07 (2003) (arguing that securities gatekeepers fail the public by
not adequately screening for corporate wrongdoing).
19
See, e.g., Vikas Bajaj, If Everyone’s Fingerpointing, Who’s to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008
(discussing the myriad of suits and countersuits filed among the parties involved in the subprime mortgage
crisis); Michael Crouhy, Robert A. Jarrow, & Stuart M. Turnbull, The Subprime Credit Crisis of 07, at 8-19
(July 9, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1112467 (discussing the array of market participants
who have potential culpability for the subprime mortgage crisis).
20
See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011,
1020-1025 (2009) (discussing the shortcomings of each major gatekeeper during the financial crisis).
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public regulators nor private gatekeepers made meaningful efforts to address the
subprime mortgage debacle until it was too late. 21
Both public and private actors share blame for the crisis, yet the responses of
bailouts and financial reforms focused largely on one side of the coin: expanding powers
for public regulators to oversee the financial sector. While crises create understandable
impulses for the state to consolidate power, the federal government must also come to
grips with the limits of the state’s ability to monitor the financial world on its own.
Public regulators face intrinsic regulatory limits in overseeing financial firms based on
information barriers, limited resources, and the political influence of Wall Street. 22
Regulators are always playing catch up in overseeing financial innovation while being
out-manned and out-gunned by their private sector counterparts. As a result, regulators
are likely to follow in their own well-worn footsteps of futility if they rely solely on
public tools. It will be difficult for them to detect the signs of trouble until it is too late,
and the next crisis in collateralized debt obligations, derivatives, or the latest fad in
financial innovation is at their doorstep. 23
The obstacles to direct public enforcement of securities law make the potential of
gatekeepers as complements and substitutes for public enforcement particularly
important. For example, the enormity of the SEC’s mandate and the dearth of specialized
skills and insider knowledge among SEC officials may make direct oversight of all but a
small percentage of potential corporate actors practically infeasible. These limits may
curb the efficacy of SEC scrutiny even when problems capture the attention of
regulators. 24 In contrast, the specialized services supplied by rating agencies, lawyers,
and accountants provide them with systematic opportunities to detect, prevent, and/or
alert the public about risky corporate conduct or fraud. 25 Whether policymakers like it or
21

See DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL 15-33 (2010) (providing an overview of the
regulatory missteps that led to the financial crisis).
22
See, e.g., Binyamin Appelbaum, On Finance Bill, Lobbying Shifts to Regulations, N.Y. TIMES, June
26, 2010, at A01 (discussing how banks have responded to the aftermath of the financial crisis by hiring
legions of lobbyists and financial regulation lawyers to stymie oversight and reform).
23
See Donald C. Langevoort, Technological Evolution and the Devolution of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 3–16 (2004); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 18–20.
24
For example, the Securities & Exchange Commission has a staff of approximately 3,600 who are
responsible for overseeing over 10,000 publicly traded companies; over 10,000 investment advisers who
manage over $37 trillion in assets; nearly 1,000 fund complexes; 6,000 broker-dealers with 172,000
branches; and the $44 trillion worth of trading conducted each year on U.S. stock and options exchanges.
See A Review of Investor Protection and Market Oversight with the Five Commissioners of the Securities
and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the House Committee of Financial Services, 110th Cong.
(June 26, 2007) (statement of Christopher Cox, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission), at 10.
The Commodities Futures Trading Commission faces an equally herculaen task of having 700 employees
oversee the $37 trillion U.S. futures market and the $300 trillion U.S. swaps market. See Gary Gensler,
Chairman CFTC, Letter to Senate and House Appropriations Committees, Feb. 13, 2012, available at
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/genslerstatement021312.pdf.
25
See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 308–09 (describing a gatekeeper as a “reputational intermediary”
who “receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in misconduct” compared to the primary
wrongdoer); Hamdani, supra note 3, at 63 (defining gatekeepers as parties who “offer a service or sell a
product that is necessary for clients wishing to enter a particular market or engage in certain activities”);
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not, the limited reach and resources of the state dictate the need to enlist private parties to
complement the government’s monitoring role.
A. The Rationale for Gatekeeper Guarantors
However necessary private gatekeepers may be to fulfill public enforcement
goals, the financial crisis highlighted a longstanding problem facing gatekeepers: how to
incentivize gatekeepers to do their job. While private gatekeepers may have the ability to
fill public enforcement gaps, they often lack the incentive to do so as they are beholden to
their clients and face little risk of public accountability for lax monitoring.
Gatekeepers have long enjoyed appeal as potentially cost-effective means for
outsourcing public enforcement roles to private parties. Rating agencies oversee debtors’
default risk, accountants assess financial risks, and lawyers police for fraud. 26 The
distinctive feature of gatekeepers is that their service role equips them with the means and
ability to detect excessive risk taking or fraud by their clients and to intervene to stop or
disclose this activity. Gatekeepers enjoy significant informational advantages over public
regulators, and if properly incentivized can monitor risk taking and wrongdoing in ways
that regulators could not hope to achieve on their own.
In theory reputational concerns alone should incentivize gatekeepers to oversee
their clients. 27 Rating agencies, lawyers, and accountants in large part derive their
income and status from their reputations as perceptions of their integrity and
effectiveness are what give their opinions value. 28 The problem is that reputation is
“sticky” in that market actors often give much greater weight to past reputation than to
more recent shortcomings in gatekeeping. 29 A dramatic loss of confidence in a
gatekeeper can lead to a backlash or in rare cases even collapse, which was illustrated in
the fall of Arthur Anderson after alleged collusion in Enron’s accounting fraud. 30 But
Jackson, supra note 3, at 1050–54 (describing gatekeepers as actors who provide indispensable, or at least
extremely useful, services to the targeted wrongdoers, have similar monitoring capacities, and who cannot
easily be replaced by wrongdoers).
26
The appeal of outsourcing enforcement functions to private gatekeepers is that this approach
promises to enhance enforcement while reducing direct state expenditures. See Kraakman, supra note 3, at
54, 55-57 (discussing government’s broad enlistment of gatekeepers in a variety of contexts).
27
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004
U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 26 (arguing that rating agencies’ “reputational motivation is sufficient” and that
“[a]dditional regulation of rating agencies thus would impose unnecessary costs and thereby diminish
efficiency”).
28
Gatekeepers have long professed that concerns for their reputations provide robust incentives for
their integrity and accuracy in their screening roles and eclipse any short-term gains from turning a blind
eye to client misconduct. See, e.g., Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability
Necessary?, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 296–98 (1988) (arguing that the reputational costs that accountants
may face from failing to detect wrongdoing provide them with adequate incentives to monitor their clients).
29
See, e.g., Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1011,
1050-1052 (2009) (discussing the reputational staying power of rating agencies in spite of their more recent
poor track record).
30
See Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1237-39 (2002) (discussing the
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strong reputational reactions are the exception, rather than the rule. 31 Memories in
financial markets often appear to wane as the euphoria of market bubbles builds.32 Even
to the extent that reputational concerns matter, gatekeepers such as auditors and lawyers
are the masters of caveats. They are quite adept at performing their duties while
distancing themselves from client outcomes. 33 Monetary incentives fuel gatekeepers’
incentives to paper over clients’ misdeeds as they may understandably not wish to bite
the hands that feed. 34
If reputation is not enough to incentivize gatekeepers, policymakers are stuck with
the challenge of using the threat of sanctions to deter wayward gatekeepers from shirking
their responsibilities. 35 This approach may also prove fruitless. 36 The problem is that
the same skills and leverage that enable gatekeepers to detect excessive risks or
wrongdoing may enable them to cover up both their clients’ and their own tracks.
Policymakers often have to grapple with the challenge of how to set sanctions to
incentivize gatekeepers’ compliance if the probability of detecting wayward gatekeepers
is quite low. 37 Set the sanction too high and gatekeepers may exit the industry leaving
interdependence of Arthur Andersen’s auditors with Enron and the internal agency problems that
compromised Arthur Andersen’s integrity).
31
For example, the reputations of rating agencies were tarnished by their role in the sub-prime
mortgage crisis, yet within a year of the Dodd-Frank Act rating agencies’ reputations had recovered to the
point where downgrades and threats of downgrades of the United States had a significant impact on
financial markets. See Jeffrey Manns, The Revenge of the Rating Agencies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011.
32
Reputational constraints have waned amidst bubble markets, and broader shifts in the risk-seeking
behavior of participants in financial markets have dampened the force of reputational constraints. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57 BUS. LAW 1403, 1408–09
(2002).
33
A related concern is the interconnectedness of individual gatekeepers and their clients. For
example, while fees from a given company may constitute a small percentage of the revenues of a law firm
or accounting firm, a single client may frequently account for the majority of the revenue stream for
individual lawyers and auditors. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 322–23 (discussing how auditing firms as a
whole may have a broad set of clients, but arguing that individual auditors who serve a large client such as
Enron effectively have their economic interests interconnected with a single client).
34
For example, the combination of “origination” and “proliferation” credits that partners receive are
designed to intertwine their economic interests with their firms, yet also form a web that binds law and
accounting partners more closely to their clients. See William D. Henderson, What Do We Know About
Lawyers’ Lives: An Empirical Study of Single-Tier Versus Two-Tier Partnerships in the Am Law 200, 84
N.C. L. REV. 1691, 1700-03 (2006) (noting the significance of origination and proliferation credit structures
within law firms); Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An
Economic Inquiry into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313,
335-39 (1985) (laying out a theory explaining profit sharing incentives within law firms).
35
The logic of focusing enforcement on gatekeepers rather than their wayward clients is that
gatekeepers receive a disproportionately small percentage of the fruits of issuer misconduct. See Coffee,
supra note 3, at 308–09.
36
See Hamdani, supra note 3, at 63-64.
37
The more complicated the activity that private gatekeepers are called to oversee, the more necessary
the gatekeeping role may appear, yet the more difficult it may be for the government to oversee gatekeeper
compliance. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity,
2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 2–6, 18–20 (discussing how even sophisticated private investors may have
difficulty in understanding detailed disclosures in a reasonable time period because of the complicated
nature of corporate transactions).
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even larger public enforcement gaps. Set the sanction too low, and regulators may invite
brazen disregard of gatekeeping duties. The result is that the public enforcement
potential for gatekeepers is often wasted because gatekeepers have little at stake in the
outcomes, and regulators have little means to incentive the gatekeepers. Worse still,
gatekeepers’ shortcomings in policing their individual corporate clients magnify systemic
risks in the aggregate by creating an appearance of oversight that belies the reality of
monitors with little at stake. 38
Integrating the concept of gatekeepers with guarantors would remedy the
incentive and oversight problem that plagues gatekeepers. It would focus the self-interest
of gatekeepers on effective risk management and oversight of their clients by linking
monitoring and insurance roles. The defining feature of guarantors is that they assume a
percentage or all of the liability for their client’s obligations in the event of a default
(generally in exchange for a stream of payments). 39 The context may be as mundane as a
parent’s guaranteeing her child’s lease to secure an off-campus apartment or as complex
as a reinsurance treaty guaranteeing billions of dollars of an insurer’s potential liabilities.
Corporations may put their credit on the line to guarantee fulfillment of a contract; a bank
may issue a letter of credit to backstop a transaction; or a credit default swap may cover a
party’s losses in the event of a debt default.
While guarantees provide greater certainties for credit markets, they generally
come at a higher financial and informational price than conventional gatekeepers may
impose. For example, a legal opinion or auditor’s letter is often an exercise in caveats
and liability avoidance with express conditions that the conclusions are based on the
information provided by the client. 40 In other words, the role of lawyers and auditors
allows them to implicitly embrace a “see no evil, hear no evil” approach in applying legal
or accounting standards, while minimizing their obligation to scrutinize their clients.
In contrast, the virtue of guarantors is that they possess the powerful incentive of
self-interest to demand as much information, conditions, and compensation from clients
as they believe necessary to justify the financial commitment. This approach avoids
having regulators face the daunting challenge of establishing what level of diligence or
scrutiny is sufficient to satisfy a gatekeeping duty and what type of sanctions to impose if
gatekeepers are caught shirking their duties. Instead, guarantors must learn the hard way
about what level of scrutiny to impose (and the level of costs to incur) as a condition of
issuing guarantees, since they must internalize the costs of failure. As importantly, the
38

The concern is not merely gatekeeper noncompliance or formalistic compliance, but worse still that
this outcome may foster contempt and embolden subversion of the law. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal
and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 781, 787 (2001)
(highlighting the inefficiencies of reputational markets).
39
See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
47, 49-52 (1999) (discussing the economic logic of guarantee arrangements); Neil B. Cohen, Striking the
Balance: The Evolving Nature of Suretyship Defenses, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1025, 1027-1028 (1993)
(explaining the purpose for guarantees and incentives for the parties involved).
40
See, e.g., Samuel A. DiPiazza Jr., David McConnell, William Parrett, Mike Rake, Frans Samyn, and
James Turley, Caveat Auditor?, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 2006 (an op-ed piece from the heads of leading
accounting firms’ acknowledging the shortcomings of the auditing process).
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liability exposure that guarantors face constitutes self-enforcing sanctions. No regulator
or prosecutor has to determine the scope of liability for guarantors who fail to constrain
the risk taking of their clients. 41 Instead, the regulator’s role can be limited to confirming
gatekeeper guarantors meet reserve requirements to ensure that the possibility of bailouts
or bankruptcy does not distort the incentive of gatekeeper guarantors to price risk
accurately.
Guarantors would serve a potentially useful purpose by simply imposing
conditions on their clients for guaranteeing particular transactions as banks routinely do
in granting letters of credit. But this Article would seek to have guarantors also serve a
public purpose by enlisting guarantors as repeat players. Guarantors would guarantee not
simply a particular transaction, but rather a percentage of a client’s broader overall
liabilities or a percentage of a category of liability exposure, such as derivatives or
collateralized debt obligations. The approach would seek to ensure that guarantors have
incentives to monitor and shape the conditions imposed on their clients on a rolling basis
in a more swift and precise way than bureaucrats could hope to accomplish.
B. The Gatekeeper Guarantor Framework
This Article’s mandate for “gatekeeper guarantors” is designed to overcome the
shortcomings of conventional gatekeepers, while leveraging the monitoring potential of
the private sectors. Gatekeeper guarantors would fuse traditional gatekeeping (i.e. the
public enlistment of private monitors) with the guarantor role in providing an insurance
role as a liability backstop to monitored parties. 42 The gatekeeper guarantor mandate
would create a decentralized private complement to the federal government’s oversight of
systemic risks. It would also serve as a private backstop to mitigate the scale and risk of
future bailouts. The federal government could deputize gatekeeper guarantors to screen
for and mitigate market risk while providing assurance to markets of the ability of private
actors to fulfill this role by creating and overseeing reserve requirements for gatekeeper
guarantors.
The centerpiece of the gatekeeper guarantor approach would be the enactment of
a public mandate that systemically significant financial entities (or participants in
systemically significant financial sectors) secure private guarantees to cover a set
percentage of their potential liabilities.43 Gatekeeper guarantors would act as both
41

See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 387 (2004)
(discussing how the virtue of “self-enforcing sanctions” is that they “are imposed implicitly and ex post”).
42
Compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The Challenge of Fashioning
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 308–09 (2004) (framing a gatekeeper as a “reputational
intermediary” who “receives only a limited payoff from any involvement in misconduct” compared to the
primary wrongdoer) with Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 47, 49-52 (1999) (discussing the economic logic of guarantee arrangements).
43
See, e.g., Robert W. Adler, Unfunded Mandates and Fiscal Federalism: A Critique, 50 VAND. L.
REV. 1137, 1140-48 (1997) (criticizing the fiscal, legal, and policy arguments against federal mandates);
David A. Dana, The Case for Unfunded Environmental Mandates, 69 S. Cal. L. REV. 1, 39-45 (1995)
(critiquing
objections
to
mandates
as
vehicles
of
regulatory
change).
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“circuit breakers” and “bailout buffers” for the financial system. They would function as
circuit breakers of systemic risk by acting as self-interested monitors of risk taking.
Gatekeeper guarantors would price their assessments of clients’ risk exposure into the
fees for guarantees and enjoy contractual leverage to oversee and limit clients’ risks. Just
as a circuit breaker cuts off the current when there is a power surge, gatekeeper
guarantors would be in a position to reduce or cut off their clients’ access to financial
markets as their risk exposure increases. Gatekeeper guarantors would be able to red flag
excessive risk taking by their clients by demanding ongoing disclosures as a condition of
a guarantee. They would have the incentives and ability to demand that insured parties
temper risk taking in real time or lose their guarantee coverage.
Gatekeeper guarantors would also act as “bailout buffers” by providing financial
backing to systemically important firms in the event of defaults and thereby mitigating
the government’s potential liability exposure in future bailouts. This backing would
make it harder for Wall Street to externalize the costs of firms’ reckless behavior on the
public. It would also provide political insulation for policymakers to hold off on bailouts
until private backstops are fully used.
While the financial cushion of a private backstop would reduce burdens on public
coffers, the key is the incentive effect that the liability exposure of gatekeeper guarantors
will have in fostering proactive monitoring of and intervention with clients. The net
effect would be to create a class of self-interested monitors with incentives to identify
incipient bubble markets and to take (at least some of) the air out of bubbles by
pressuring clients to reduce their risk exposure and/or strengthening their liquidity in real
time.
Gatekeeper guarantors’ oversight and management of individual clients’ risk
taking would have an aggregate impact in reducing systemic risks. No other actors
would be in as strong a position to secure and synthesize insider market data to assess
their individual clients’ risk exposure and to get a bigger picture of the landscape of
financial risk. Government regulators lack the ability to perform this type of risk
management function directly, and no traditional gatekeeper would ever have the
incentive to assume this type of role because they have much less at stake in each
client. 44 As financial innovations take place and become widespread, gatekeeper
guarantors would be on the front lines of financial markets and would be able to demand
new types of information from their clients (before government actors are even aware of
potential problems). 45 As a result, gatekeeper guarantors would be potentially able to
recognize and address emerging problems to reduce the scale and scope of their clients’
exposure. This risk management role would dampen the potential for market frenzies.

44

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV.
323. 342-349 (2007) (discussing the limited scope of reputational and financial risk exposure that
gatekeepers face which undercuts their incentives for performing active monitoring of clients).
45
See Michael S. Barr, The Financial Crisis and the Path of Reform, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 95
(arguing that financial innovation may outpace the ability of both regulators and markets as a whole to
understand and respond).
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An additional virtue is the potential for “secondary accountability” by gatekeeper
guarantors to extend their leverage over insured parties to heighten disclosure from
counter-parties. Gatekeeper guarantors would not only be able to demand that insured
parties disclose information, but also they would be able to push insured parties to
demand similar disclosures from counter-parties. In this way private contracting and
business relationships could potentially accomplish what law may not be able to do: i.e.
achieve extra-territorial reach to heighten disclosure and temper risk-taking. 46
This approach would be especially important in derivatives markets in which
counter-parties may be based all over the globe and are therefore subject to a variety of
legal regimes. Participants in the American market would have no choice but to work
with gatekeeper guarantors, and in turn their best way to reduce costs would be to show
that they are providing timely and accurate information flows about their own risks and
the risks of their counter-parties. While this approach would not cover transactions with
participants who are both outside of US markets, it would result in a significant contrast
with the world in heightening greater transparency and lowering risk for those dealing
with participants in US markets.
This approach would complement the government’s role in directing regulating
the targeted financial activity. But government oversight of gatekeeper guarantors
themselves would be a necessary complement to foster faith that private actors would
have the financial wherewithal to fulfill this expansive private role. While the gatekeeper
guarantor proposal is designed to empower private actors to assess and price risk, markets
would want assurance that gatekeeper guarantors possess the financial means to fulfill
this private backstop role. Imposing federal or state reserve requirements on gatekeeper
guarantors would provide credence that private actors are able to fulfill this role. Reserve
requirements would also assist the federal government in providing a clearer picture of
the degree to which gatekeeper guarantors would provide a bailout buffer. A big enough
wave of financial shock can swamp any ship, but the existence of gatekeeper guarantors
would allow government actors to project more plausibly the scope of government
support that may be needed.
C. The Significance of Institutional Accountability
One of the primary objectives of mandating gatekeeper guarantors is to create
ongoing institutional accountability for systemically significant firms. A system that
merely required hedging of individual transactions could be resolved through use of
piecemeal derivatives designed to secure coverage (or more cynically to check the box of
the regulatory requirement) without having any counter-party aware of the full scope of
liability exposure. The concern is that derivative counterparties would have no ongoing
relationship with the systemically significant firm (aside from the transaction itself).
Derivatives counterparties would therefore have limited means to monitor and shape the
other party’s overall risk exposure. Counterparties may be able to provide a better
46

See Kenneth A. Bamberger & Andrew T. Guzman, Keeping Imports Safe: A Proposal for
Discriminatory Regulation of International Trade, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1405, 1408-09 (2008) (discussing the
legal and practical limits on government’s extraterritorial reach).
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system of accountability than the government or existing gatekeepers provide, but they
would still lack the ability or incentive to get a full understanding of the big picture of the
targeted firm’s risks. The primary constraint on excessive risk taking would be the
willingness of market participants to enter into derivatives transactions with the targeted
firm if there is growing uncertainty about the firm and/or the broader economy.
The piecemeal approach to covering risk exposure would raise a problem of
excessive risk dispersion, similar to what occurred in the mortgage-backed securities
market. 47 Numerous parties would carry risk, but all would have such a small amount of
risk in any particular transaction that none would have the incentive to monitor the
targeted parties effectively. For example, in the collateralized mortgage obligation
context, financial instruments were sliced into so many tranches that owners of these
instruments had little incentive to monitor the issuers. End purchasers owned a broad
range of collateralized-mortgage obligations from different issuers in the hope that
diversification would reduce risks. However, the irony was that owning small amounts
of a broad range of collateralized mortgage obligations dramatically magnified risk. The
growing risk exposure of individual issuers and issuers in the aggregate was not properly
monitored until it was too late. 48
In contrast, the gatekeeper guarantor approach would be designed to create
sustained accountability by creating repeat player relationships with targeted firms rather
than a myriad of one-off transactions. Having a single gatekeeper guarantor
backstopping each targeted firm would mean that the self-interest of gatekeeper
guarantors would be clear cut. The gatekeeper guarantor would have to internalize a
percentage of all of the liabilities of its client, and would face restrictions barring it from
selling off the risk exposure to third parties (e.g. a prohibition on issuing catastrophe
bonds or a functional equivalent to disperse its risk exposure). 49 This approach would
give gatekeeper guarantors strong financial incentives to demand disclosures and
conditions in exchange for commitments. This approach would address the problem of
risk dispersion. Additionally, gatekeeper guarantors would be in a position to control
their own risk exposure. They could actively oversee their clients, and assume a broad
enough pool of clients to ensure that they can internalize the cost of their (and their
clients’) errors of judgment.

47

See Stephen L. Schwarcz, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 18 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5.
10-11 (2009) (discussing how a high degree of risk dispersion can create a collective-action problem as no
party may have sufficient risk exposure to incentivize them to engage in due diligence or risk monitoring).
48
See John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent Developments in U.S.
Subprime Mortgage Markets, International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 07/188 (2007), at 11, available
at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/wp07188.pdf (arguing that the “originate-to-distribute
model” of mortgage-backed securities was fatally flawed as it was “driven by fee generation” and
“facilitated by risk dispersion and compartmentalization”).
49
See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER & ERWANN O. MICHEL-KERJAN, AT WAR WITH THE WEATHER:
MANAGING LARGE-SCALE RISK IN A NEW ERA OF CATASTROPHES 174-190 (2009) (providing an overview
of catastrophe bonds and other risk transfer instruments); see also Bertil Lundqvist, Catastrophe Bonds as
a Method of Securitizing Insurance Risk, Practicing Law Institute, PLI Order No. A0-0033, at 804-805
(Dec. 1999) (discussing how reinsurers have used catastrophe bonds to externalize risks).
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D. Learning From the Mistakes of Bond Insurers
The financial crisis exposed the shortcomings of a form of incomplete gatekeeper
guarantor – monoline insurers (“monolines”). 50 Learning from the inadequacies of
monolines in bond insurance is important for understanding how to make a gatekeeper
guarantor mandate work. Monolines provide investor guarantees on municipal, state, and
corporate bonds. 51 Beginning in the 1970s monolines offered insurance for municipal
bonds whose primary credit risk (until recently) was liquidity as their ability to tax
tempered their risk exposure. 52 But as monolines’ appetite for risk and revenues grew
they also began offering insurance for structured financial products. 53
The fatal flaw of the monolines was that they were thinly capitalized and too
aggressive in taking on risk, and as a result were singularly unprepared for the wave of
defaults that hit during the financial crisis. 54 The irony of the monolines is that their
downfall came because they functioned in practice as neither gatekeepers nor guarantors.
Monoline insurers were not true gatekeepers in that their guarantees served as credit
enhancement, a way to laurel and boost perceptions of credit, rather than to serve as a
necessary gate for issuing debt like the role of ratings. Monolines also did not function as
true guarantors as lax pricing and systematic under-estimation of risks meant they
provided the worst of all worlds – a fig leaf of coverage that had little substance.
Additionally, no regulatory safeguards existed to ensure that monolines had sufficient
reserves to cover financial tsunamis or even market panics. The sole assurance was that
bond insurers hadn’t failed in the past, 55 which proved to be little comfort in the crisis. 56

50

See, e.g., John Patrick Hunt, Rating Dependent Regulation of Insurance, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 165168 (2010) (discussing how bond insurers’ failure to gauge risks in the run up to the financial crisis raised
systemic risks and cast doubts about the viability of the bond insurance industry).
51
For example, one of the largest monolines, Security Capital Insurance, had a portfolio that was
approximately 40% municipal and state debt and 60% corporate and asset-backed debt. See Security
Capital Assurance, Year-End 2007 Operating Supplement 17-18 (2008).
52
See Vikram Nanda & Rajdeep Singh, Bond Insurance: What is Special About Munis?, LIX(5) J. OF
FIN. 1, 7 (discussing the comparatively lower risk of municipal bond defaults than corporate bond defaults);
James P. McNichols, Monoline Insurance & Financial Guaranty Reserving, Casualty Actuarial Soc'y, 23335 (2003), available at http:// www.casact.org/pubs/forum/03fforum/03ff231.pdf.
53
See Robert P. Bartlett, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives
Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, J. CORP. L. 1, 4 (2010); Christine Richard, Ambac, MBIA Lust for
CDO Returns Undercut AAA Success, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 22, 2008, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aw1Oh4B0Wvv8 (noting that from 2003 to
2008 Ambac’s profit margin averaged 48% and MBIA’s profit margin 39%, which was driven by the rapid
expansion of their insurance of CDOs).
54
See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State Bankruptcy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 323,
325 (2011).
55
See, e.g., Mahesh K. Kotecha, The Role of Financial Guarantees in Asset-Backed Securities, in
ISSUER PERSPECTIVES ON SECURITIZATION 95-97 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 1998) (discussing the appeal of
bond insurers since they had never experienced ratings downgrades).
56
See Reuters, On Appeal, MBIA Wins a Challenge to Its Split, Jan. 11, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/business/12mbia.html?_r=0 (discussing the bankruptcy of Ambac the
restructuring of MBIA to forestall bankruptcy in the wake of the financial crisis).
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In the absence of a mandate for bond guarantees, monolines faced both an adverse
selection and risk correlation problem. Weaker or more volatile bond issuers sought the
legitimacy of bond insurance, which meant that monolines were left to choose between
assets that not only were more vulnerable to shocks but were more likely to deteriorate at
the same time. 57 For example, the leading monolines, MBIA and Ambac, provided
insurance for only a small percentage of the amount of CDOs that were issued during the
roaring 00s. But this liability exposure was more than enough to sink both companies
because their coverage focused on correlated, high risk assets, and they lacked the
necessary reserves to cover their obligations. 58
In contrast, the virtue of a mandate approach for systemically significant sectors is
that it would create access to a broader pool of assets and reduce the risks that gatekeeper
guarantors are saddled with weak, highly correlated assets. A mandate would give
gatekeeper guarantors leverage to impose more stringent criteria for offering coverage or
to deny or limit market access to risky actors or assets. In the absence of a mandate
gatekeeper guarantors may have incentives to race to the bottom by competing on price
and laxity in scrutinizing assets. In contrast, a mandate for coverage would position
gatekeeper guarantors to focus on their screening roles and designing safeguards to
protect themselves. A mandate would also allow a deeper pool of strong assets implicitly
to cross-subsidize weaker assets by potentially providing greater levels of gatekeeper
guarantor reserves. A broader pool would not necessarily address the concern of risk
correlation, which is a challenge facing any effort to mitigate systemic risks given the
interconnections of the financial world. 59 But this approach would position gatekeeper
guarantors to design portfolios of coverage that attempt to mitigate risk correlation
concerns.
The imposition of reserve requirements on gatekeeper guarantors would also
serve to give gatekeeper guarantors greater leverage. The absence of effective reserve
requirements for bond insurance exposed monolines to the temptation to print money by
offering guarantees without having any plausible means to pay. 60 In contrast, regulatory
reserve requirements would balance giving gatekeeper guarantors flexibility to assess and
price risks, while providing assurance that a cushion of reserves exist. Gatekeeper
guarantors could point to reserve requirements to justify higher fees or more stringent
conditions, while conveniently blaming the government rather than directly shouldering
the blame with clients. Critics may be concerned that reserve requirements could serve
as a thin justification for higher fees (and profits), but if reserve requirements create
incentives to retain profits than it would advance the objective of building bailout buffers.
57

See Michael C. Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 GEO. L.J. 605, 622 (2012)
(discussing the problems of asymmetric information and adverse selection).
58
See Ambac Financial Group Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 59 (2008) (stating that the monoline
had exposure for approximately $29 billion of CDOs at the onset of the crisis in 2007); MBIA Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K) 66 (2008) (establishing that the company faced liability exposure for approximately
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See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1151,
1152-55 (2010) (discussing the challenges posed by risk correlation).
60
See Robert P. Bartlett, Inefficiencies in the Information Thicket: A Case Study of Derivatives
Disclosures During the Financial Crisis, J. CORP. L. 1, 4-5 (2010).
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Skeptics may point to the shortcomings of monolines as evidence that self-interest
may be subordinated to risk seeking behavior amidst market bubbles. But arguably the
experience of living through the financial crisis may temper excessive risk seeking by
future gatekeeper guarantors. Just as a generation of bankers learned risk aversion the
hard way by living in the shadow of bank failures during the Great Depression, 61 actors
assuming a guarantee role would learn from the failures of their monoline predecessors.
Risk aversion may decline with time as the financial crisis retreats in memory. But it is
reasonable to expect that the severity of the financial crisis will foster more conservative
risk modeling and a paradigm shift towards “trust but verify” that will give greater
plausibility to an expansive gatekeeper guarantor role.
An important additional dimension of this proposal is the requirement that
gatekeeper guarantors hold on to the liability they assume, a constraint monolines and
other guarantors historically have not faced. 62 Passing on liability to third parties would
allow gatekeeper guarantors to pass the buck of accountability and fuel moral hazard in
terms of pricing and screening for risk. In contrast, internalizing potential liability would
force gatekeeper guarantors proactively to factor risks into coverage premiums.
The goal of the gatekeeper guarantor approach is to create an additional sea wall
to preempt or dampen the force of future financial tsunamis. Just because sea walls, such
as monoline insurance, may have been poorly designed and overseen in the past doesn’t
mean that we should abandon sea walls to hold back future storm surges. The danger of a
decentralized approach is that parts of the sea wall may not prove to be as strong as
others because of differing approaches to assuming risk. But both the experience and
design of a gatekeeper guarantee role, such as reserve requirements, can dampen this risk.
In a big enough wave any system of sea walls may be breached and require a government
backstop. Nonetheless, by adding a system of circuit breakers and bailout buffers
policymakers would have a tool to limit leverage and speculation and reduces systemic
threats.
E. Leveraging the Potential of Reinsurers
One key to making this proposal work is finding a pool of actors with a sufficient
capital base and the willingness to take on the risks of offering financial guarantees. One
plausible candidate is the reinsurance industry which has the experience to assess and the
capacity to assume large-scale risks. The virtue of enlisting reinsurers as gatekeeper
guarantors would not be that there would not be a need to create gatekeeper guarantors
out of whole cloth. Instead, this approach would seek to leverage existing expertise and
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See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry 1975-2000:
Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 227 (discussing the risk
aversion of the generation of bankers that lived through the Great Depression).
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See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-9/11 Economy: The Convergence of Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 500-502 (2005) (providing an overview
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redirect it to assessing financial risk. 63 The same expertise that allows reinsurers to
condition insurers’ risk taking and gauge liability for natural and man-made catastrophes
could be employed to oversee risks in financial contexts. 64
The long track record of reinsurers would provide benchmarks for new entrants to
use in developing their own models for assuming gatekeeper guarantor roles and pricing
catastrophic risks. For example, sovereign wealth funds and private equity firms would
also have relevant experience in assessing financial risks and the deep pockets to meet
reserve requirements. 65 These financial actors would have incentives to enter the market
on their own or partner up with reinsurers to offer the financial wherewithal and
experience to take on this new private regulatory role. While this Article will refer to
reinsurers from this point on, this term refers to a range of actors who may potentially
step into a reinsurance role and be subjected a regulatory framework modified to reflect
the challenges of financial reinsurance.
Reinsurers already cover trillions of insurance risk and simultaneously temper and
expand the potential for insurance markets. 66 Reinsurers allow insurance companies to
engage in risk pooling by not having to internalize all of the risk of their insurance
policies on their own books. 67 The logic is that each individual insurer can cover a
broader basket of risks because it does not have to internalize the full extent of
catastrophic losses. 68 Reinsurance also potentially has diversification benefits in that
reinsurers may cover broader cross-segments of markets than any insurer. 69 Therefore,
the reinsurer may have a more stable financial foundation when a catastrophic event
disproportionately hits a particular sector. Reinsurers may also enjoy comparative
advantages in assessing the probability and impact of catastrophic risks. Since the
purpose of reinsurers is to serve as a backstop in extremis, their focus is almost
exclusively on assessing the costs of low probability, high impact events. They would
have the incentives to temper the more optimistic assumptions of insurers to ensure that
63

See, e.g., Aviva Abramovsky, Reinsurance: The Silent Regulator, 15 CONN. INS. L.J. 345, 375-77
(2009) (discussing the private regulatory role that reinsurers play in shaping insurers’ risk taking in
underwriting and claims handling).
64
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Caps on Damages,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 711, 771 (2007) (discussing the statistically based risk modeling that reinsurers
use to gauge and price catastrophic risk exposure).
65
For example, sovereign wealth funds’ access to substantial long-term funding makes them able to endure
short-term fluctuations and promote “economic growth and job production . . . and economic stability.”
MARTIN A. WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: BACKGROUND AND POLICY
ISSUES
FOR
CONGRESS
334,
335
(2009),
available
at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/110750.pdf.
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See Thomas Holzheu & Roman Lechner, The Global Reinsurance Market, in INTERNATIONAL
INSURANCE MARKETS (J. David Cummins & Bertrand Vernard eds. 2003) 877, 881-883 (laying out the
scale of the global reinsurance industry).
67
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 140(a), at 1015 (4th ed. 2007)
(framing reinsurance as “essentially insurance for insurance companies”).
68
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 141, at 1056 (4th ed. 2007) (noting
that reinsurance helps to guarantee that insured parties are not wiped out by a single catastrophic event).
69
See Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-911 Economy: The Convergence of Capital Markets,
Insurance, and Government Action, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 435, 519 (2005) (discussing the benefits from
reinsurers’ diversification of risks).
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they wouldn’t be left holding the bag in terms of the ultimate liability exposure. Lastly,
the use of reinsurers would provide a signal to the marketplace that not only does the
insurer have (at least a partial) backstop, but also that the reinsurer is willing to put its
reputation on the line to vouch for the insurer.
Under a reinsurance treaty, reinsurers assume liability for a percentage of an
insurers’ business. 70 The focus of the reinsurer is on assessing the underwriting
standards, track record, and overall liability exposure the insurer is taking on. 71
Reinsurers employ a variety of approaches for allocating risk between the insurers and
reinsurers. Under a quota share or pro rata approach, reinsurers take on a specific
percentage of liability exposure for all losses that a reinsurer faces in exchange for
sharing a parallel percentage of the insurers’ net premiums. 72 The vice and virtue of this
approach is that the reinsurer functions as a syndicate participant with the insurer. The
reinsurer is looking over the shoulder of the insurer in terms of monitoring underwriting
standards, risk management, and overall liability exposure. While the reinsurer is
outsourcing the risk screening, it shares in the risk exposure in proportion to the
percentage of premiums it receives.
Under an excess of loss approach, the reinsurer covers losses above an agreed
upon level or covers a percentage of losses above a given threshold. The logic behind
this approach is that the insurer has to internalize the first level of exposure of loss, so
that it has to bear the primary consequences of its own risk taking. The reinsurer steps in
as a backstop for all or part of the liability after the agreed upon threshold. 73 In other
words the reinsurer focuses on the catastrophic losses, while leaving ordinary loss
concerns to the insurer. Both the pro rata and excess of loss approaches would be
potentially applicable to this Article’s proposal. While the excess of loss approach would
focus reinsurers more clearly on catastrophic risks, both approaches would add a private
backstop and monitoring role to temper insurers’ risk taking. 74
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See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 140(b), at 1054 (4th ed. 2007)
(explaining that “[m]ost reinsurance is treaty reinsurance,” which can be framed as “automatic reinsurance”
in which the reinsurer commits to cover a percentage of the insurers’ liability exposure or a percentage
above a set threshold – excess basis – for a stated period).
71
Alternatively, reinsurers may also embrace facultative reinsurance (case-by-case assumption of
insurance risks) or automatic facultative reinsurance agreements (in which reinsurers assume specified
types of risks for a given line of business). See Donald A. McIsaac & David F. Babbel, The World Bank
Primer on Reinsurance, Policy Research Working Paper 1512, at 4 (1994). The focus of this article is on
the reinsurance treaty approach that makes reinsurers serve as institutional backstops.
72
See BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §
1502(a), at 993 (12th ed. 2003) (observing that under a pro-rata reinsurance contract the reinsurer shares a
percentage of the insurance premium in exchange for taking on a corresponding portion of the liability
risk).
73
See BARRY OSTRAGER & THOMAS NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES §
1502(b), at 994 (12th ed. 2003).
74
See GRAYDON S. STARING, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE § 1(1), at 4 (Supp. 2008) (arguing that the
virtue of both pro rata and excess of loss approaches is that the reinsured party “retains a sufficient amount
of the risk to give the reinsurer confidence that the policy will be well administered”).
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F. Designing Reserve Requirements to Ensure Financial Wherewithal
Combining reserve requirements and government monitoring with an expanded
role for reinsurers would be necessary to avoid the danger that reinsurers become straw
men providing a fig leaf of oversight, yet in reality legitimizing reckless risk taking. 75
One virtue of enlisting reinsurers as gatekeeper guarantors is that state regulation already
applies based on the state of incorporation. 76 State regulators subject reinsurers to similar
oversight as insurers, which means coopting reinsurers as gatekeeper guarantors offers a
backdoor way to incorporate some of the elements of both the private and public
regulation of insurance. 77
Reinsurers, however, face a lighter touch of oversight than insurance companies,
particularly in regard to reserve requirements which would need to be significantly
expanded to ensure reinsurers’ financial whereithal. The nature of financial reinsurance
may also require federal, rather than state oversight due to the clear inter-state and
international nature of the risks.
While insurance pricing is a heavily regulated area that attempts to protect
consumers, state regulation does not extend to the pricing of reinsurance as it is assumed
that insurers and reinsurers are both sophisticated parties. 78 Giving reinsurers flexibility
to price risk is consistent with the underlying objective of empowering gatekeeper
guarantors to perform this role. Insurers are subject to reserve requirements to guarantee
their solvency, but state regulators’ deference to reinsurers in pricing unfortunately
extends to reserve requirements. 79
One lesson from bond insurers’ shortcomings during the financial crisis is that
reserve requirements are needed to ensure that faith in rensurers’ financial integrity is
justified. 80 This goal could be achieved by extending more stringent insurance reserve
requirements to the reinsurance context or by designing risk-based capital requirements
75

In the absence of reserve requirements reinsurers may gamble that they will never have to cover
defaults and therefore, if regulators cast a blind eye, they could undercut legitimate reinsurers and
undermine the credibility of the reinsurance market. Similarly, it would be important to address the captive
reinsurer problem. For example, large banks often have reinsurance affiliates, and policymakers would
want to keep them out of any reinsurance role for bank affiliates to avoid the danger of rubber stamping
risk.
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See Reinsurance Reform Act of 2009, Sept. 9, 2009 (eliminating extraterritorial application of state
laws and promoting more efficient solvency regulation of reinsurers by providing for a single state to
oversee reinsurers).
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See HAL S. SCOTT, CAPITAL ADEQUACY BEYOND BASEL: BANKING SECURITIES AND INSURANCE 110
(providing an overview of state oversight of reinsurers).
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See GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INSURANCE REGULATION: STATE REINSURANCE
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BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 22, 2008 (discussing how Ambac’s and MBIA’s zeal for short-term profits led to
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that reflect the information asymmetries and uncertainties reinsurers face vis-à-vis the
insured parties. Risk-based capital rules could be adapted from the insurance and the
financial institution context to both benchmark the percentage of reserves needed for
types of asset classes (or lines of business) that are insured and to design asset-to-capital
ratios that delineate the degree to which different types of capital qualify as reserves. 81
For a system of risk-based capital requirements to work, reserve requirements would
need to be coupled with periodic reporting requirements of qualitative and quantitative
data to facilitate government oversight, as well as a framework for preventive and
corrective action when capital thresholds are breached.
A federal insurance regulator would be best suited to administer risk-based capital
requirements. For example, one downside of vesting responsibility for setting and
overseeing reserve requirements with state regulators is that reinsurers would have
incentives to engage in forum shopping to choose the most minimal reserve requirements.
A related concern is that state insurance regulators may not have the competence or
ability to oversee a redefined reinsurance role that intersects with the securities world.
Conventional home, life, or even automobile insurance fit within statue auspices as it is
reasonable to expect that state insurance commissioners can understand and address these
risks. In contrast, financial issues are both inter-state and international in nature and may
push the competency expectations for state insurance regulators beyond plausibility.
For this reason it would be desirable to federalize reinsurance oversight or at
minimum to set a floor of federal reserve requirements for state-based regulation. 82 The
Dodd-Frank Act created a Federal Insurance Office (FIO), which represents a modest
first step towards a federal role in insurance regulation. 83 The FIO is an office within the
Treasury Department which has advisory, coordinating, and monitoring roles concerning
insurance issues, but has no authority to do anything more than make recommendations
about insurance-related systemic risk concerns. 84 However, expanding federal oversight
of insurance remains part of the financial reform agenda as the FIO is currently
conducting a study to make recommendations to Congress about whether and to what
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See, e.g., National Association of Insurance Commissioners, The United States Insurance Financial
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Harrington, Capital Adequacy in Insurance and Reinsurance, in HAL SCOTT ED., CAPITAL ADEQUACY
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extent there is a need for a federal insurance role. 85 It is unclear whether an office of the
Treasury Department is the appropriate place to silo a federal insurance and reinsurance
regulator, or whether it should be a freestanding agency or part of a financial regulator,
such as the SEC. But having a federal regulator set minimum state standards for
reinsurance regulation and reserve requirements or assume direct authority would provide
additional safeguards against the emergence of reinsurer straw men.
There would be a learning curve for a federal insurance regulator overseeing both
insurance and the expanded reinsurance role discussed in this Article. But the systemic
risk concerns are comparable to other financial risk areas already overseen by the federal
agencies. At minimum having national oversight or a common state standard would
alleviate concerns about underfunded reinsurers by setting uniform reserve requirements
for reinsurers based on the dollar amount of derivative risk they are guaranteeing. 86
This proposal’s reinsurance mandate for derivatives seeks to unlock the potential
of reinsurers to leverage their self-interest and ability to oversee the derivatives’ industry.
But this approach also recognizes that relying purely on private ordering would raise its
own dangers. That is part of the appeal of coopting the reinsurance industry as
gatekeeper guarantors as it would facilitate building on existing government safeguards
(and a potentially expanded federal role) to ensure that reinsurers face credible oversight
and reserve requirements.
G. The Degree of Gatekeeper Guarantor Liability Exposure
The virtue of a gatekeeper guarantor mandate is that it would add a private layer
of oversight of systemic risks, yet result in minimal direct costs on the federal
government. Guarantors would independently negotiate the terms of the guarantees,
conduct their own oversight of clients, and enforce any claims they may have for breach
of guarantee conditions.
One challenging question is what level of coverage should be mandated, whether
under a quota or an excess of loss approach. Regulators may want as high a level of
coverage as possible since the larger the private backstop is, the lower the burden of
defaults may be on the government. But the tradeoff is that the higher the mandate of
liability exposure, the more it will test, if not overwhelm, the capacity of the reinsurance
industry (or other gatekeeper guarantor entrants), as well as reduce the number of actors
willing to participate in the market. The irony may be that the higher the level of the
percentage of liability covered by reinsurers, the greater the chance that reinsurers will be
unable to live up to their obligations during a crisis, as occurred to many bond insurers
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The Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the Federal Insurance Office conduct a study for Congress
assessing the merits of state insurance regulation and make recommendations about whether federal
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alternative to state-based regulation).
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during the recent crisis. 87 That outcome would thwart the purpose of the gatekeeper
guarantor mandate. If that were the case, both the reinsured parties and the reinsurers
would be tempted to anticipate government intervention and may take or allow more
reckless risk taking.
As a result, regulators should err on the low end in terms of liability exposure that
gatekeeper guarantors should assume. The goal should be to create a high enough
percentage of liability to induce active monitoring by gatekeeper guarantors without
making coverage provision unappealing or unsustainable. For this reason, an excess of
loss approach may have the most appeal with a modest level of liability exposure. A
plausible benchmark would be gatekeeper guarantor liability coverage of 5 to 10% of all
losses above a set strike point of losses. 88 This figure is a hybrid of public and private
conceptions of how much risk exposure is sufficient to incentive effective oversight. The
Dodd-Frank Act’s “skin-in-the-game” rules require originators of mortgage-backed
securities to retain 5% of the liability exposure. 89 In contrast, longstanding market
practices among banks require originators of loan participation interests to retain at least
10% of the liabilities. 90
The 5 to 10% liability exposure is even more plausible in the reinsurance context
since reinsurers, unlike originators, would be unable to design deals in a way that cherry
picks liability exposure. 91 This threshold of liability exposure would give gatekeeper
guarantors incentives to condition coverage on regular updates from insured parties about
their degree of expected losses and actual losses and remedial measures to ensure
liquidity. In turn, gatekeeper guarantors would then have a window for pressing their
clients to alter their risk exposure before they would have to start internalizing part of
their clients’ losses. This approach would leverage the potential of gatekeeper guarantors
as circuit breakers who would have the power and the opportunity to pressure their clients
to modify their risk profile if they appear over-extended.
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See John Patrick Hunt, Rating Dependent Regulation of Insurance, 17 CONN. INS. L.J. 101, 165-168
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II. The Appeal of a Reinsurance Mandate for Derivatives
Over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives epitomize both the potential and pitfalls of
financial innovation and the challenges of public and private efforts to oversee risk taking
on Wall Street. 92 For this reason derivatives serve as a valuable case study for
considering the potential for gatekeeper guarantors to complement the government’s
management of systemic risk. OTC derivatives account for an almost $450 trillion dollar
notional market that covers almost every conceivable type of risk. 93 These instruments
empower participants to hedge against foreseeable risks or to engage in speculation with
unprecedented leverage, all while circumventing the constraints of securities, insurance,
and gambling law. 94
Throughout the exponential growth of derivatives over the past twenty years
Congress scaled back regulation of derivatives and largely deferred to industry selfregulation. 95 However the role of derivatives in the collapse of AIG and Lehman
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26

Brothers and the broader crisis underscored the systemic risks posed by derivatives and
belatedly spurred Congress to action in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act of 2010. 96 The daunting challenge Congress faced in
derivatives reform was how to establish accountability, curb leveraged speculation that
poses systemic risks, and provide a solvency backstop for an industry whose notional
value dwarfs the world’s economy. Congress recognized the desirability of private
oversight by requiring OTC derivatives to be traded on exchanges and that clearing and
settlement of trades take place on and be backed by central clearinghouses. 97
The recognition of the need for private oversight of risk exposure was a key step
of progress. The problem is that Congress’s strategy of making central clearinghouses
for OTC derivatives contracts the focal point for regulation and risk management may
perversely magnify the systemic risks that reforms are intended to address. Mandating
that all OTC derivatives’ contracts are publicly disclosed and traded on exchanges is
useful in heightening standardization and transparency, but adds little additional value.98
The focal point of derivatives reforms is the clearing requirement, which entails netting
of participants’ liabilities and the clearinghouse’s commitment to ensure transactions will
be completed. 99 This role positions clearinghouses to impose capital and margin
requirements on participants ex ante. In theory the mandate empowers clearinghouses to
impose capital calls on all clearinghouse participants ex post to cover defaults.100 While
the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission (CFTC) share joint authority in overseeing the clearinghouses, 101 the
efficacy of reform turns on whether clearinghouses have the means and incentives to
oversee their membership and manage systemic risks.
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The challenge is that clearinghouses are potentially subject to substantial
influence from industry participants. 102 The concern is that clearinghouses may function
largely as the sum of their parts of market participants, rather than to serve as genuinely
independent gatekeepers. The dilemma is that the compensation of clearinghouses
depends on both the volume and scale of transactions, and the willingness of market
makers to use their services. For this reason, both clearinghouses and individual
participants may have little incentive to take preemptive steps to temper excessive
leverage while bubbles grow. Instead, clearinghouse participants may have incentives to
double down on risk exposure. Both the clearinghouses and individual participants may
trust that large enough collective liability exposure in the event of a crisis will almost
guarantee government bailouts to avoid a disastrous domino effect. 103
The limits of clearinghouses suggest the need to consider other alternatives for
private monitoring and accountability. The enlistment of gatekeeper guarantors could fill
this oversight gap. Derivatives were originally designed to sidestep onerous state
insurance regulation. 104 A gatekeeper guarantor approach would recognize derivatives’
roots by treating derivatives as a proxy for insurance hedging and mandating third-party
reinsurance coverage for derivatives’ transactions. Creating a reinsurance mandate
would build on the long-standing practice of insurers’ contracting with reinsurers to serve
as a liability backstop. In exchange for an up-front payment, reinsurers would assume a
percentage of a given insurer’s liability exposure in the event of defaults. 105
This approach to managing systemic risk would empower third-party reinsurers to
perform self-interested gatekeeping roles in overseeing derivatives’ participants and
conditioning their leverage in preemptive ways. Because reinsurers would stand to lose if
derivatives’ participants proved to be insolvent, reinsurers would have strong incentives
to monitor the extent of their clients’ liability exposure and ability to live up to their
obligations on a daily basis. Reinsurers would have leverage to demand any and all
102
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information necessary to justify the commitment to serve as a backstop for a derivatives’
participant and to condition additional derivatives’ exposure on further disclosures and
the reinsurer’s consent. As importantly, the repeat-player status of reinsurers would
position them to force derivatives’ participants to price in changes in risk exposure into
their agreements as events unfold. Reinsurers would also be able to require derivatives
participants to take additional preemptive steps if signs of shifts in risk arise (e.g.
anticipatory increases in reserves in anticipation of market changes).
A. The Logic Behind Clearinghouses
Mandating that OTC derivatives transactions be traded on exchanges and cleared
and settled by clearinghouses serves a constructive purpose in heightening transparency
and disclosure and reducing settlement risks. 106 Making the amount of OTC derivatives
contracts more transparent through exchange trading helps to inform markets about the
scope of each participant’s risks and makes it easier to gauge system-wide risk
exposure. 107 As importantly, clearinghouses are designed to mitigate transaction risks.
The basic process is straightforward. OTC derivative counterparties enter into trades
through electronic trading systems or exchanges, such as the Eurex US trading platform.
Once the trading platform executes the trade, the clearinghouse not only registers the
trade and nets the liabilities, but also effectively steps into the shoes of the parties on both
sides of the trade to guarantee that the trade will be completed.
In order to safeguard against default by participants, the clearinghouse imposes
collateral and margin requirements on each party. Clearinghouses enforce margin
requirements on a rolling basis, determine mark-to-market value of all open positions on
a daily basis, and net each participants’ liability obligations. 108 In the event of defaults,
the clearinghouse typically either has a fund to cover losses (collected from clearinghouse
participants) or more importantly has the power to impose capital calls on all
clearinghouse participants ex post to cover actual losses. 109
The result of these related functions is that clearinghouses serve a positive role in
mitigating settlement risks. Netting of participants’ offsetting transactions, requiring
margin deposits, assessing mark-to-market value of trades and collateral, and disclosing
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the nature and scale of participants’ exposure all serve to shed light on the derivatives’
industry to both participants and markets as a whole. The problem is that clearinghouses’
incentives in practice are likely far different than advertised, which undermine their risk
reducing role.
B. The Clearinghouse Critique
Two significant concerns may compromise the ability of clearinghouses to
perform a gatekeeping role. First, clearinghouses may lack the requisite independence
from their members or participants to identify and defuse risks to the financial system in
a preemptive way. Second and far worse, the use of central clearinghouses may
ironically magnify the potential for systemic risks to overwhelm the financial system by
incentivizing firms to pass on counterparty default risks to clearinghouses and ultimately
to the federal government. 110
The question of clearinghouse independence turns in part on their structure.
Traditionally, clearinghouses were literally the sum of their parts as an umbrella
organization for member financial firms to engage in transactions. Mutualization meant
that every member firm had a stake in the clearinghouse, but it also meant that members
and the clearinghouse as a whole potentially had incentives to turn a blind eye to a
members’ financial difficulties until it was too late since all were part of a cozy club. 111
The “business” of a mutually owned clearinghouse or exchange was implicitly the
business of its members. Even self-interested measures to protect the exchange may fall
prey to the furtherance of members’ short-term interests.
The moral hazard may ironically be even more stark in the context of ostensibly
independent clearinghouses, which form the overwhelming majority of clearinghouses
today. In the case of clearinghouse owned by their members, it appears hard to avoid the
implication that member firms ought to be accountable for fellow members’ defaults. In
contrast, independently owned clearinghouses offer the appearance of true autonomy.
However, they are dependent on the leading players for most of their revenue streams.
Therefore, they may be vulnerable to industry influence and the at times reckless
approach to leverage and risk their members embrace.
The example of the Clearing Corporation underscores how the appearance of
independence may belie the reality and impact of Wall Street firms concentrating their
risks in a handful of clearinghouses. While its predecessor company was founded in
1925 as an independent commodities clearinghouse, the Clearing Corporation’s modern
incarnation as an OTC derivatives’ clearinghouse for the major banks stems from
110
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December 20, 2007. 112 Twelve major global dealers in OTC derivatives, Eurex,
Europe’s largest derivatives’ exchange, three inter-dealer brokers, and the leading OTC
service provider joined forces to create a member-owned clearinghouse for OTC
derivatives. The list of major global dealers included almost every major financial
institution (at the time): Bank of America, Bear Stearns, Citigroup, Credit Suisse,
Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, MF
Global, Morgan Stanley, and UBS. 113
The emergence of the Clearing Corporation as a clearinghouse for OTC
derivatives anticipated Congress’s current legislative mandate for OTC derivatives’
contracts to pass through clearinghouses. 114 But unfortunately it also exposed the danger
that central clearinghouses could exacerbate systemic risks. By placing most of the major
financial institutions’ derivatives contracts under one roof, the industry ensured that the
clearinghouse would serve to magnify interconnections among the parties and the
systemic risks posed by defaults by one or more of their parties. If one or more of its
members’ failed, then the clearinghouse’s role as a centralized backstop all but
guaranteed the industry leverage to demand a government bailout. 115 Ironically, the
timing of the formation of the Clearing Corporation as a clearinghouse for OTC
derivatives could not have been better for the industry’s members as it provided an
institutional framework for coordinating industry efforts to outsource liability to the
American taxpayers.
The financial crisis provided an immediate test case for the ability of the
clearinghouse to manage systemic risks. It is possible that but for the existence of
clearinghouses such as The Clearing Corporation uncertainties surrounding the scope of
derivatives’ liability could have been greater, which could have triggered an even larger
crisis. Advocates of a central clearinghouse approach can also argue that the problem
was that not enough entities were participating in clearinghouses at the time of the crisis,
which sparked greater uncertainties. But the most damning indictment of clearinghouses
throughout the recent crisis was that there was no affirmative evidence that
clearinghouses were able to mitigate systemic risks and prevent a domino effect in the
event of their members’ collapses. Three of the twelve members of The Clearing
Corporation literally collapsed during the crisis (Bearn Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and
Lehman Brothers). Two others: Bank of America and Citigroup effectively became
wards of the state that have only recently been weaned off of government-provided life
support.
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The interconnection of these giant derivatives’ participants under one roof
arguably made it harder for preemptive actions to be taken by clearinghouses as no
clearinghouse member stood to gain from exposing others’ weaknesses. More
insidiously, even though entities like Goldman Sachs demonstrated through their trading
activity that they questioned the solvency of other members, they had little to gain from
sharing this information with other clearinghouse members to address systemic risks.
Instead, Goldman Sachs simply used this information to mitigate their own exposure by
selling holdings and taking offsetting positions. The bottom line was that none of the
members who collectively ran the clearinghouses had any incentive for the
clearinghouses to perform their gatekeeping function for preemptively policing against
systemic risks. Instead, interconnections of guarantee liability merely served to make it
more likely that the government would have no choice but to bail the industry out. The
irony is that clearinghouses such as the Clearing Corporation proclaim that no derivatives
counterparty has lost money due to a default by member firms. 116 However, “success”
during the most recent crisis had little to do with clearinghouses as this outcome occurred
only because the government either provided liquidity or brokered shotgun marriages
with other firms to avoid defaults.
The evolution of clearinghouses in the wake of the financial crisis has provided
little additional assurance that clearinghouses are capable of filling the systemic risk
management roles that Congress (and industry advocates) envision. 117 In an effort to
preempt regulation, industry participants have sought to strengthen the appearance of
independence of clearinghouses and to make broader commitments to disclosing and
clearing trades through clearinghouses. 118 For example, on October 20, 2008, the
Clearing Corporation was formally sold to Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., an
international operator of future exchanges and over-the-counter markets. The Clearing
Corporation became ICE US Trust (“ICE Trust”) and the derivatives clearinghouse
operations became ICE Clear US. 119 But both the purchase and the clearinghouse’s
development into a global clearing solution for OTC derivatives were based on the
support of nine of the major investment banks who are the leading dealers in OTC
markets. 120 This list included all of the major survivors of the financial crisis, including
Bank of America, Citibank, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan,
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Merrill Lynch (though now a subsidiary of Bank of America), Morgan Stanley, and
UBS. 121
This deal nominally secured the greater independence of the ICE Trust
clearinghouse, but in practice it arguably strengthened the hand of the leading investment
banks in shaping the role of a centralized OTC derivatives’ clearinghouse. The banks
could point to the formal purchase of the Clearing Corporation to argue that their
derivatives’ transactions are subject to effective independent oversight.
But at the
same time, the existence of this clearinghouse expressly rests on the support of the
leading investment banks. The clearinghouse operator entered into memorandums of
understanding with each of these banks to develop a joint global clearing solution and to
effect this acquisition. In other words, the clearinghouse continues to be subject to the
strong influence of its leading investment bank members. 122 Congress’s embrace of a
central clearinghouse approach to reform merely reinforces the leading investment banks’
power. 123 However much investment banks may contest greater regulatory oversight of
derivatives, the clearinghouse approach leaves them in charge of their industry’s destiny.
The fact that the leading investment banks pooled their energies to advocate
independently for a more robust role for central clearinghouses highlights the fact that the
banks, rather than the clearinghouses, exercise effective power. Clearinghouses can still
be expected to perform useful market purposes in mitigating settlement risks in non-crisis
situations. However, clearinghouses enjoy little leverage to push derivatives participants
to temper risk taking and to defuse growing systemic risks.
C. The Potential for Reinsurers as Gatekeeper-Guarantors for Derivatives
Reinsurers acting as gatekeeper guarantors would have both far greater incentives
and ability than either industry-led clearinghouses or the SEC and CFTC to oversee
derivatives’ markets. The moral hazard of clearinghouse risk pooling is that each
individual member’s interest in monitoring counterparties’ solvency is dampened by the
fact that default risk is shared among the clearinghouse members. 124 Herding behavior in
financial markets accentuates this moral hazard and raises a broader collective action
problem. 125 Individual members are likely to engage in excessive leverage at similar
points in the economic cycle. They have little interest in exhorting the clearinghouse to
take preemptive steps to limit risk exposure (in part because it may highlight their own
overstretch to the broader market).
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Worse still, savvy clearinghouse members would also likely act only for their own
accounts, such as Goldman Sachs did in reducing its exposure to mortgage-backed
securities on the eve of the crisis.126 Each clearinghouse member would likely have more
to gain from their own speculation or taking advantage of others’ recklessness, than they
would gain from alerting the clearinghouse of other members’ excess. The irony is that
the potential cost of facing clearinghouse calls to members to cover a defaulting party
would not offset incentives to profit from exploiting irrational exuberance and/or trusting
that any significant crash would be covered by future government bailouts. 127
Unlike government overseers and clearinghouses, reinsurers would have “skin in
the game” by having their own dollars at stake, which gives them far greater incentives to
hold derivatives’ participants accountable.128 Reinsurers would be barred from hedging
or passing on their liability exposure to third parties to ensure that their focus would be
on accurately assessing clients’ derivatives risks. 129 Reinsurers would be able to apply
their longstanding experience in assessing and pricing insurance risks to examine the
analogous issues facing the derivatives’ industry. 130 Additionally, reinsurers would be
able to respond much more quickly to changes in the marketplace than their government
counterparts, as reinsurers could impose changes through their contractual arrangements.
In contrast, their government counterparts must affect changes through painstakingly
long rulemaking processes or by engaging in enforcement actions.
Reinsurers would only need to assume a modest amount of liability exposure for
them to assume an effective gatekeeper-guarantor role. As discussed earlier, a
benchmark of 5 to 10% of liability above a set loss threshold would be sufficient to
incentive gatekeeper guarantors to actively monitor derivatives participants and impose
conditions on their liability exposure. 131 Not only would reinsurers have incentives to
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function as the “canaries in the mines” in identifying earlier signs of over-leveraging, but
also they would have the leverage to demand that their clients curtail risk exposure to
mitigate the scale and impact of potential bubbles. In this way they would serve as
classic gatekeepers in identifying and remedying risks well before government actors
even are aware of them and at dramatically lower cost. Their partial guarantor role would
create self-interested incentives to temper clients’ risk taking, which would achieve a far
greater impact in stabilizing and disciplining markets than blanket government guarantees
during crises which are rife with moral hazard. 132
D. Improving on Margin Requirements
Reinsurers would be in the position to address participants’ liquidity in a more
proactive way than clearinghouse collateral and margin requirements. The logic of
margin requirements is elegant in its simplicity. As losses mount, a party is required to
provide additional capital as a surety of its ability to live up to its obligations. 133 In
theory if changes in risk exposure are gradual, this approach works well. Both individual
derivatives participants and the marketplace as a whole would be able to see whether and
to what extent parties are able to live up to their obligations and adjust accordingly. 134
The shortcoming of margin requirements is their reactive nature, which makes
this risk management tool ill equipped to either deal with looming storm clouds or
dramatic changes in financial markets. Higher margin only kicks in when the market
trigger takes place, regardless of how clearly storm clouds may be gathering and raising
warning signs. 135 The lack of independence of clearinghouses from the major players
makes this problem doubly difficult. For margin requirements to assure derivatives
participants’ solvency in a crisis they would have to be set at high levels or to be adjusted
to higher levels as systemic risks increase. But exchanges/clearinghouses would have
incentives to set margin levels low to court business, and they may not enjoy the leverage
to push back at their clients when higher margin requirements were needed to curb
growing systemic risks. 136
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Clearinghouse margin requirements also appear inadequate for addressing market
panics.
The financial crisis underscored the reality of how quickly and dramatically
risk exposure can change for derivatives. Overreactions define market shifts as
participants either don’t want to be left behind on an upswing or don’t want to be the last
passengers on a sinking ship. As a result, the actual changes in risk exposure can take
place so swiftly that they may undercut the ability of derivatives’ participants to live up
to their responsibilities. The rapid collapse of AIG due to reckless derivatives’ positions
highlights this point. 138
137

In contrast, reinsurance treaties can equip reinsurers with the ability to impose
anticipatory steps well before any actual changes in risk exposure. Reinsurers would not
only be far more sensitive to shifts in market risk than clearinghouses because much more
of their own money is on the line, but also they may have a better appreciation of what
degree of capital is required to ensure that their clients can live up to their obligations.
An additional virtue of reinsurers is their decentralization. While clearinghouses may be
vulnerable to pressure from dominant participants, individual reinsurers would be in a
much stronger position to act unilaterally. Reinsurers would have the leverage to demand
that clients secure greater liquidity or reduce liability exposure or face the sanction of a
public withdrawal of a reinsurance guarantee. In troubled markets following through on
that threat could be tantamount to a death warrant, which would mean in practice
reinsurers could exercise a broad tempering influence on risk taking through private
words and informal pressure.
One concern is the degree to which reinsurers will be able to process disclosures
by derivatives participants in reacting to changes in risk exposure. 139 The danger is that
reinsurers may not fully process how the technical terms of derivatives can change the
risk exposure, the degree of fluidity of derivatives, or collateral business risks that could
impact the capacity of participants to uphold their obligations. While the informational
challenges are significant, these issues would create incentives for reinsurers to push for
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greater standardization of derivatives contracts and disclosures and to err on the side of
risk aversion in gauging risks and limiting liability exposure. 140
E. Impact of Reinsurance Mandate in Reducing the Degree of Speculation
Part of the appeal of mandatory reinsurance is that reinsurers will impose a
market-based speculation tax that would raise the cost and limit the degree to which
derivatives are used for speculation. While the use of derivatives as a hedging device
reduces risk exposure of individual firms and the market as a whole, the use of
derivatives as a tool of speculation may dramatically magnify risk. The problem is that
derivatives serve as “synthetic insurance” instruments without the need to have an
insurable interest. 141 That fact means that parties can use derivatives as a form of largescale gambling with high levels of leverage and with few safeguards. 142
The simplest way to address the role of speculation would be to treat derivatives
as proxies for insurance, which would implicitly recognize that derivatives arose to
sidestep onerous state insurance regulation. Applying an insurance approach would
require derivatives’ participants to establish that they have insurable interests at stake in
each transaction (i.e. the typical requirement for insurability) which would squelch
speculation. 143 The danger of this draconian strategy is that it would have a chilling
effect on participation and could potentially dry up liquidity for derivatives markets.
In contrast, the reinsurance approach offers a way to preserve a role for
speculators in derivatives markets, while creating a built-in check on the reckless use of
leverage. The key step that a reinsurance mandate would entail is requiring hedge funds
and other lightly regulated pools of capital to subject themselves to the scrutiny of a
reinsurer in order to participate in derivatives markets. This oversight would make it
more difficult for speculators to engage in “naked” derivatives bets that could lead them
exposed to financial ruin if their assumptions proved to be faulty.
Reinsurers’ pricing power is the other tool that could dampen speculation. To the
extent that hedge funds or other speculators would choose not to disclose as much
information about their financial positions, one would expect that reinsurers would
charge substantially more to serve as backstop. This result would serve as a private “tax”
on speculators that would reduce their ability to leverage bets through derivatives
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markets. Even if a corporation hedging insurable risks and a hedge fund speculator made
the same level of disclosures, reinsurers may impose higher fees on the hedge fund
because of the greater risks incorporated into a hedge fund’s business model compared to
that of a more conventional corporation. This approach avoids the difficulties posed by
having a government regulator distinguish between corporate hedging and speculation, 144
while still having the result of “taxing” speculators at a higher rate and mitigating the
systemic risks posed by excessive leverage.
III. Addressing Potential Objections
A. Exit and Liquidity Concerns
Derivatives reform represents a classic case of concern that regulation will stifle
innovation or lead to transatlantic (or transpacific) migration of derivatives to other
financial markets. 145 This challenge may be more significant in the derivatives context
than other contexts of financial reform, such as banking regulation, because derivative
transactions can easily be conducted offshore and the United States is not even the
premier derivatives’ market. 146 Even if U.S.-based corporations or firms with a
substantial U.S. presence faced a reinsurance mandate for derivatives that they could not
avoid, they would argue that this burden would simply empower their foreign-based
competitors by giving them a cost advantage. These risks also easily play into the hands
of industry lobbyists to pressure congressmen and regulators to water down any
legislation that survives the congressional process.
Any national regulation that trades off higher costs for greater monitoring is going
to raise risks of firms or industries exiting the country. Three questions merit
consideration. First, one issue is whether the benefit of more effective monitoring is
worth the cost, which in part is an issue of market perception. 147 To the extent market
participants perceive that the overall benefits in reducing systemic risks outweigh the
costs, this approach may actually draw more derivatives transactions to the U.S. Even to
the extent that market participants favored lower costs to greater market monitoring,
during economic turbulent times mandatory reinsurance coverage would offer assurance
that U.S. derivatives’ markets were safer than competing foreign markets. This fact
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means that when liquidity is needed the most, U.S. markets may enjoy a comparative
advantage in attracting derivatives’ capital.
Second, every time financial or corporate law reforms are raised, companies
routinely cry wolf. They claim that the reforms are so onerous that to avoid them they
will exit U.S. markets, yet very few firms follow through on that threat. For example, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s corporate reforms were decried as creating incentives for U.S.
firms to leave U.S. markets. But almost a decade later, the hue and cry about SarbanesOxley has come and passed, and only a small number of firms exited the U.S. market. 148
Similarly, corporate opponents to the Dodd-Frank Act proclaimed that financial reforms
would drive businesses from the U.S. To date this concern appears to have little
substantiation (despite its rhetorical appeal for opponents of business regulation). 149
Third, even to the extent that some transactions would not take place in the United
States or would not take place at all, the impact on market liquidity is unclear. The
question is whether a gatekeeper guarantor approach would prove to be too successful in
imposing a de facto tax on speculation and thereby reduce liquidity. One of the most
significant concerns during the financial crisis and its aftermath has been maintaining
liquidity in financial markets. 150 Liquidity concerns are particularly important for
derivatives markets because of the leverage that derivatives allow firms to take on.151 By
having to post only a small amount of capital to cover margin requirements, firms can
potentially reap significant gains (or losses) from small price fluctuations in the
underlying security or other instrument that forms the basis of the derivative. High levels
of leverage require equally high levels of liquidity to allow firms to unwind derivatives
bets that have gone awry swiftly to avoid greater damage.
This proposal’s cost for bona fide hedgers would likely be modest. Entities using
derivatives as a low cost equivalent of insurance would be able to substantiate the fact
that their use of derivatives reduces overall risk. Therefore, risk reinsurers would
presumably impose low premiums to reflect the low risks. In contrast, the parties most
likely to have incentives to exit the U.S. market or not to engage in derivatives
transactions would be speculators. Speculators may argue that derivatives reduce their
overall risk if their derivative use is part of their hedging strategies. However, to the
extent that derivatives transactions constitute speculation in themselves, reinsurers would
148
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likely impose higher prices for their coverage. As a result, speculators may be priced out
of derivatives’ markets, relocate operations abroad, or may simply reduce their degree of
leverage.
The question is whether a gatekeeper guarantor approach would reduce leverage
to a greater degree than it would reduce liquidity in derivatives markets. Reinsurers
would reduce the degree of leverage in speculative derivative bets by pricing reinsurance
for speculative bets at a higher price than bona fide hedging. Reinsurers would also
reduce leverage by seeking to limit both speculators and hedgers from over-extending
themselves, especially during turbulent economic times. For this reason concerns about
the impact on liquidity would likely be overblown. Since reinsurers have direct
incentives to constrain the liability exposure of their clients, they would have reason to
reduce the risk of over-stretch and mitigate liquidity needs before a crisis erupts.
It would be foolish to assume that reinsurers themselves may not be prone to
exuberance during bullish economic times. 152 However, reinsurers would have the
incentive to implement a standing system of checks on their clients to ensure that they
have caps on the degree of leveraged derivatives bets, as well as the ability to increase
constraints as economic conditions deteriorate. Additionally, reserve requirements on
reinsurers would impose a practical constraint on leverage that reinsurers would seek to
extend on to their clients. As a result, derivatives participants would be less able to
leverage themselves into a situation in which future liquidity crises will arise. Of course
liquidity crises may still arise, but they would likely be attributable to broader systemic
factors well beyond the scope of derivatives markets. 153
B. Political Challenges
One perpetual challenge of policy proposals is their political feasibility. That
prospect may be particularly daunting in the derivatives context because of how recently
the problem was “addressed” in the Dodd-Frank Act.154 The dilemma is that every
legislative enactment, however flawed, stands as the definitive word on the subject until
its shortcomings are demonstrated by a future crisis or shortcomings so blatant than even
Washington cannot ignore them. 155
As discussed earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act sets the current derivatives landscape
and may make a future crisis a matter of time by centralizing derivatives’ risk in a small
number of central clearinghouses.156 This approach gives leverage to the industry leaders
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over clearinghouses because of the understandable concern of keeping their business.
The effect may be to create the illusion of effective third-party monitoring, while
obscuring the reality that industry leaders enjoy influence over their purported
gatekeeper.
The concentration of OTC derivatives in a small number of
exchanges/clearinghouses all but ensures that a default by a major player will lead to a
bailout.
While the failure of the existing regulatory framework may be a matter of time,
significant stumbling blocks towards meaningful reform of derivatives regulation and
oversight exist. Major players in the derivatives industry worked hard to shape the
contours of the Dodd-Frank Act to preserve their power. 157 They could be expected to
fight the gatekeeper-guarantor mandate more fiercely since they would be paying for the
“privilege” of greater monitoring and accountability.
While industry opposition may prove unavoidable, the underlying political appeal
of this proposal is straightforward. Simply by enacting a mandate, the federal
government could create a decentralized private system of circuit breakers for financial
overstretch and a private bailout system for the derivatives markets. In a time of financial
austerity, this approach would allow lawmakers to create a new layer of self-interested
oversight to a key sector of the financial system without engaging in significant direct
expenditures. This private approach would bypass the fate of much of the Dodd-Frank
Act of being bogged down in a rule-making process in the face of behind-the-scenes
industry pressure. 158 Additionally, this approach would not suffer from the revolving
door effect of regulatory enforcers holding back from oversight and enforcement (or
engaging in lower levels of both) for fear of alienating prospective future employers. 159
While challenges exist, the benefits to addressing systemic risks in a cost-effective way
give the proposal political plausibility.
C. Implementation Challenges
The virtue of this proposal is that its success does not primarily turn on the
independence or discretion of administrative officials (aside from creating and enforcing
reserve requirements on reinsurers). Neither does the approach depend on government
mandates that rely on as-of-yet-undiscovered technological enhancements or the
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development of new industries. 160 This approach is based on the fact that a large-scale
reinsurance industry does exist and that other financial actors such as sovereign wealth
funds and private equity funds may enter the market in response to the mandate-created
demand. Applying the reinsurance industry’s expertise would be straightforward since
the natural and man-made catastrophic insurance risks reinsurance firms routinely assess
are related to the derivative risks reinsurers would need to evaluate. 161 Other financial
actors with expertise in modeling risks would also have incentives to partner with
reinsurers or develop their own models of risk.
The challenge lies in the fact that derivatives do not necessarily involve an
insurable interest. For this reason reinsurers may have a more difficult time gauging the
risks involved and tailoring the safeguards needed to protect their own interests, as well
as their clients’. However, the experience of reinsurers in assessing natural and manmade catastrophe risks would equip them to take on a new challenge of assessing
financial risks. 162 Modeling firms provide insurers and reinsurers with computer-based
models of potential catastrophic loss exposure that enable them to price these risks. 163
Historically, modeling focused on natural catastrophes, such as modeling the likelihood
and impact from hurricanes and earthquakes. The 9-11 attacks spurred innovation in risk
modeling as modeling firms leveraged their expertise in natural catastrophe modeling to
develop terrorism risk insurance models. 164 A mandate for reinsurance would leverage
this expertise and spur similar innovation to assess financial risks.
Modeling natural catastrophes has long been key to the success of the reinsurance
industry in being able to weather past storms like Hurricane Andrew in 1992. 165 Natural
catastrophes, such as earthquakes and hurricanes, combine uncertainty of scale, timing,
and impact with the proximate predictability of historical patterns. The challenge for
natural catastrophes is weighing the partial predictability of natural phenomena with the
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increasing risk caused by growing human activity in potentially exposed areas. 166
Historical hurricane, flooding, and earthquake data, combined with policy coverage and
financial data, equips modelers, insurers, and reinsurers to gauge the likelihood and
impact of natural catastrophes. This risk exposure to low probability, high impact events
has echoes in the potential for financial reinsurance. Financial innovation, coupled with
greater leverage and risk taking, increases the probability and scale of catastrophic
damage during financial crises. Nonetheless, while financial risks are not readily
predictable (or else reinsurers would profit from that by directly investing in stock
options!), financial whipsaws are an inevitable feature of the economic cycle. The
challenge is how reinsurers can both gauge the potential fallout as well as incentivize
risk-mitigation through reinsurance premiums.
Experience in modeling man-made catastrophic risks also offer valuable lessons
because pricing terrorism risks raises similar challenges to pricing financial risks. Manmade catastrophes pose significant challenges for computer modeling because of the
inherent uncertainties and complexities of assessing the probability and impact of human
action. The nature of terrorist threats requires significant assumptions about the
likelihood of modes of attack, the extent of defense, and the probable magnitudes of
loss. 167 Much of these conclusions will be based on detailed assessments of geography,
coupled with assumptions about the nature, likelihood, and scale of attacks that may be
hard to prove or disprove since they can only be partly grounded on known facts or past
experience. 168 In contrast, the cyclical nature of markets (and over-reactions) is well
established. While financial innovation entails new challenges, it may be comparatively
easier to project the worst case scenario impact of financial events (although equally
difficult to assess their probability). 169
But in both the natural and man-made
catastrophe context, reinsurers are experienced in creating and working with models that
incorporate large-scale policy and financial data that would be parallel to the challenges
of assessing financial risks. 170
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Just as in terrorism insurance markets, 171 the difficulties in gauging financial risk
probabilities may lead reinsurers to make more conservative assumptions about the scope
of collateral / margin than the actual risks justify. That fact in turn may limit the scale of
derivatives markets, which would have both positive and negative effects. The impact
would be positive in that the risk of default and overstretch would be far less. But
policymakers may be concerned that reinsurers’ conservative assumptions would
constrain the growth and liquidity of derivatives’ markets. That result would not be bad
from a systemic risk perspective as the less stretched derivatives markets are, the more
likely they are to weather the impact of financial shocks. But conservative assumptions
by reinsurers may provoke greater resistance by industry participants both during the
initial implementation and market booms.
One clear effect is that conservative reinsurer assumptions would impose the least
burden on bona fide hedgers. Hedgers would have the means and incentive to produce
evidence that they are using derivatives to manage business risks. In contrast,
conservative assessments of risks will lead to higher reinsurance premiums which may
drive some speculators out of the market or reduce the extent of leveraged bets. While
reduced liquidity is a cost that must be weighed, conservative reinsurer assumptions
would be consistent with the objectives of reducing systemic risk and making speculation
more expensive.
D. The Danger of Reinsurer Over-stretch
The more significant danger is that over time reinsurers’ assumptions may
become less conservative as they gain experience in gauging derivatives’ markets risk.
To the extent this shift reflects a honing of reinsurers’ expertise, then lower, more
accurate pricing of guarantees would reduce transaction costs for derivatives’ markets
without compromising risk management. The concern is that reinsurers would become
equally exuberant as their clients during bull markets as the financial crisis becomes a
distant memory. 172 As a result, they may become less diligent in scrutinizing client and
markets risks and compromise their gatekeeping role. They may also charge rates so low
that they will fail to have inadequate funds to fulfill their guarantor role should defaults
occur.
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This concern arises in any public or private regulatory context as herding effects
of optimism may cause monitors to become lax. 173 Every time the economy heats up
there are reports of a “new economy” or “new economic models” that should change
assumptions about risk. 174 This concern is particularly significant in financial markets
because long, steady increases in value may disappear during rapid surges in fear and
volatility. The hangover effect from the boom may leave all actors unprepared for the
severity of the bust.
The tempering force for this proposal is that reinsurers are accustomed to dealing
with low probability, high impact events. Natural disasters in many ways mirror manmade disasters, and reinsurers know from experience that future disasters will come and
therefore plan risk-mitigation accordingly. Critics may assail reinsurers for having
excessive profits during boom periods, but their role in overseeing catastrophic risks in
non-financial contexts will make them much more likely to stick to conservative
assumptions amidst periods of irrational exuberance. 175 In contrast, public regulators
would likely face strong political pressures to relax oversight and trust markets during
boom periods. 176 Similarly, clearinghouses would have less reason to resist their clients’
optimism and to hold firm on high margin requirements, because they would potentially
be in a position to externalize catastrophic defaults onto the government. While there is
some legitimacy to the concern of relaxed standards over time, reinsurers’ self-interest
and experience will likely temper that temptation, and reserve requirements will place
limits on their ability to water down their risk assessment standards.
E. Making Interconnections Serve a Productive Purpose
Another concern with the gatekeeper guarantor proposal is that heightening
interdependence may backfire and perversely magnify moral hazard. Critics may worry
that this approach could have the same effect as banks increasing their size and
interdependence to ensure that they are too big to fail. 177 In other words greater
interconnections with a small pool of reinsurers will spread risk across the system so that
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the domino effect will be even more swift. Therefore, government intervention would be
all the more needed to keep the financial sector afloat.
There is some legitimacy to this concern as the downside of interconnections is
that chain reactions can reach a large scale much more quickly. 178 But the logic behind
the gatekeeper guarantor proposal is that interconnections can serve a productive purpose
if the liability from failure is clear and concrete. The conventional fear of domino effects
is that defaults can have collateral effects because parties will have neither the interest
nor incentive to monitor the default risk of counter-parties. In contrast, gatekeeper
guarantors would have the incentive to analyze the spectrum of an insured party’s
activities and default risk. Rather than caring only about a given transaction, gatekeeper
guarantors would focus on the aggregate of transaction risk. Gatekeeper guarantors
would have the incentive to use their leverage to force clients to scale back their risk
taking in a preemptive way. For this reason although fears of a domino effect from the
interconnectedness of major banks led to large-scale bailouts during the financial crisis,
interconnectedness with reinsurers would arguably have the opposite effect in creating
incentives to reduce systemic risks.
F. Leveraging Market Pricing to Create an Integrated Private-Public Backstop
A skeptic may argue that public bailouts would still be inevitable even if
mandatory reinsurance were in place. This Article has suggested how mandatory
reinsurance of derivatives would reduce individual participants’ and systemic risks,
which would make bailouts less likely. But part of the appeal of the reinsurance mandate
is that it would create a market-based pricing mechanism for derivatives risk that public
regulators could use in designing an ex ante bailout funding system. 179 Market pricing of
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risk serves as an end in itself in providing a check on risk overstretch, such as by making
speculative derivatives bets more expensive. But reinsurance pricing could also be
leveraged to help established a baseline of risk-based fees for a public bailout funding
system for derivatives participants.
The creation of an ex ante bailout insurance fund was rejected in the Dodd-Frank
Act legislative process, 180 in part because of the difficulties in pricing bailout
coverage. 181 The goal of an ex ante bailout fund would be both to accumulate reserves
for future bailouts and as importantly to deter excessive risk taking by imposing a riskbased cost for the government’s financial backstop role. The dilemma of all forms of
public insurance has been how to price public coverage because of the absence of market
competition. 182 Government insurance programs often have artificially low pricing
which creates minimal incentives effects for insured parties to reduce risk exposure. A
good illustration of this point is Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) coverage
of demand deposits. The FDIC imposes “risk-based” assessment rates on banks to insure
demand deposits against the risk of the bank’s insolvency. 183 These assessments are
based on a composite scorecard of banks’ examination ratings and forward looking
financial measures that distinguish between large and small banks. The basic problem is
that the incentives risk-based assessments give for banks to curb risk taking will only be
as strong as the accuracy of banking regulators’ examination standards. The track record
of bank regulators was quite poor in the run up to the financial crisis as regulators’
examination ratings of banks were deferential to the banking industry. 184 There is no
reason to believe that regulator deference to industry will be any different in the long run
which will lead to predictably low pricing of risk exposure.

The net impact was that the government offered an 85 to 90% subsidy to cover damages from future
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In contrast, one virtue of this Article’s proposal is that regulators could piggyback
off of market-based pricing for derivatives’ reinsurance in setting public bailout
insurance fees. Regulators could use the market price that parties pay for reinsurance as a
baseline for setting optional or mandatory government bailout coverage for derivatives
participants. Government bailout insurance rates could be directly linked to the
reinsurance premiums for individual derivatives participants. For example, government
bailout fees could be integrated as a multiple of reinsurance premiums to provide clear
cost-based incentives that could evolve in real time as new risks emerge. Alternatively, a
bailout regulator could use a rolling basket of reinsurance premiums to create bailout
insurance fees that dynamically respond to broader changes in market risk perception.
Either of these approaches would leverage the incentives reinsurance pricing gives to
temper risk taking. These approaches would reduce the likelihood of public subsidies for
private risk taking through artificially low pricing of public bailout coverage.
Creating a pre-funded bailout fund would raise a variety of challenges, not the
least of which is the question of whether the benefits would be worth the additional
burdens on the derivatives industry. If public coverage were optional, it is unclear the
government would have the political wherewithal only to bail out participants during a
major financial crisis. Moral hazard from free riding would be a significant problem as
firms that opt out may still push politicians for a public bailout if the crisis were large
enough. 185 The concern for compulsory bailout insurance would be both the cost and the
potential for redundancy if this Article’s proposal for mandatory reinsurance serves its
purpose in tempering risk taking. Developing the potential of the idea of public bailout
coverage piggybacking off of private risk pricing is well beyond the scope of this work.
But at minimum this proposal suggests that a reinsurance mandate would advance a
broader purpose in signaling market-based perceptions of risk to government regulators.
IV. Conclusion
At first glance it may seem counterintuitive to make the case for decentralized
risk management in the wake of the financial crisis. But while centralized intervention
was key to propping up the financial sector during the depths of the crisis, the federal
government lacks the ability and resources to identify and nip future crises in the bud.
The Dodd-Frank Act’s reform of mandating that OTC derivatives are traded on
exchanges and cleared and settled by clearinghouses appears to create additional private
monitoring. However, in practice the limits to clearinghouse independence mean this
attempt at reform will magnify systemic risks and perversely make future bailouts of the
derivatives industry more likely.
185

For example, many home owners fail to pay for optional federal government flood insurance, yet count
on politicians to include them in bailouts when large floods strike. The same problem could confound
optional government bailout coverage. See Michelle Boardman, Known Unknowns: The Illusion of
Terrorism Insurance, 93 GEO. L.J. 783, 784-85 (2005) (discussing how victims of cataclysmic losses are
likely to be compensated by the state or federal government whether or not they have insurance); Anne
Gron & Alan O. Sykes, TERRORISM AND INSURANCE MARKETS: A ROLE FOR THE GOVERNMENT AS INSURER?,
36 IND. L. REV. 447, 449-50 (2003) (discussing the moral hazard posed by government compensation for
insured and uninsured parties).
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In contrast, this Article has shown how decentralized monitoring by gatekeeper
guarantors could detect and deflate future financial bubbles. Intertwining self-interest,
risk monitoring, and guarantor roles offers an innovative way to make financial sector
interconnections serve a positive purpose. The enactment of a gatekeeper guarantor
mandate would create a private backstop in systemically important sectors, such as
derivatives, and would curb leverage by institutionalizing private circuit breakers in the
financial system. This approach will not solve all of the problems facing the financial
sector, but it would go far towards creating sustainable accountability and tempering
leverage and risk taking.
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